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“Nigeria was full of inflation, corruption, injustice, murder, armed 
robbery, maladministration, drug-trafficking, hunger, knavery, 
dishonesty and plain stupidity... But it still remained a blessed country.” 
 
Ken Saro-Wiwa, former leader of the Niger Delta organization 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), in Prisoners 
of Jebs (in Meredith 2011:544) 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how peace and conflict within Nigeria 
can be understood. This is done by the application of a range of developmental 
indicators as well as theoretical variables drawn from the field of why 
insurgencies emerge. This study also includes the role of the Nigerian state in this 
dynamic. The applied method is a within-case comparison of three cases; the 
North East: Boko Haram, Niger Delta: MEND and the South West: OPC. Semi-
structured informant interviews were done on an eight week field trip to Abuja, 
capital of Nigeria, in the spring of 2013. This qualitative material provided me 
with the basis of the empirics on how one can understand the variance and 
interaction among variables. The outcome of this study suggests that several 
contextual variables on the country level are performing badly, but that they are 
insufficient to explain why organized insurgencies emerge. Independent variables, 
such as levels of education and unemployment correlate with the level of conflict. 
Intervening variables, such as the salience of religious identity or environmental 
degradation, must coincide with other variables in order for an organized 
insurgency to emerge. Conversely, the lack of such setting results in the in-
existence of an organized insurgency. 
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1 Introduction and Background 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria is the most populous African country with 
estimated 170 million inhabitants distributed among 250 ethno-linguistic groups. 
Muslims dominate the more rural North and Christians the more urban South. 
Religion in Nigeria is divided into 50 percent Muslims, 40 percent Christians and 
10 percent indigenous believers (El-Choueiry et al. 2012). The main ethnic groups 
are the Hausa-Fulanis (29%) mainly living in the North, the Yorubas (21%) in the 
South West, the Igbos (18%) in the South East and the Ijaws (10%) in the South 
South/Niger Delta.
1
  
Nigeria has been plagued by internal strife for decades, but the trend is that the 
internal security level has worsened recently. This is noted by a simple 
longitudinal analysis of foreign policy‘s indicator ―Failed State Index‖2. Nigeria 
ranked number 54 (country number 1 being the most failed) with the total score of 
84,3 (120 being the most failed) in the year 2005. The country has been stable 
between 2010 and 2012 at the record low rank of number 14 with the total score 
of 101,1 in year 2012, after ending up at rank number 16 in 2013 with the score of 
100,7. The country is in 2013 bracketed as ―alert‖ – 10 out of 11, where 11 is the 
worst score. Nigeria performs badly overall, but the three sub-indicators that 
stands out today (2013) in the index are the social indicator ―vengeance-seeking 
group grievance‖3, scoring 9,8 and the two political and military indicators 
―security apparatus‖4, scoring 9,5 and ―rise of factionalized elites‖5, scoring 9,4 
(10 being the most unstable). (Failed States Index Rankings 2013) 
Despite this, Nigeria‘s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown at over 
seven percent for seven consecutive years (NBS Economic Outlook 2012). 
Nigeria‘s real GDP was 85,582 USD in 2010 and Nigeria is Africa‘s second 
largest economy after South Africa. Nigeria‘s economic growth has, despite high 
national income, had minimal impact on wealth distribution and the standard of 
living has not risen particularly since independence in 1960 (Campbell 2011:11). 
John Campbell, former US Ambassador to Nigeria, sites – inter alia – bad 
governance, crony capitalism, widespread corruption and underinvestment in 
agriculture and infrastructure as factors that have led a country rich of natural 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 See the map ―Nigeria‘s ethnic composition‖, section 11.1.2. 
2
 Failed state index consists in total of twelve different indicators: six political and military indicators, four social 
indicators, and two economic indicators. 
3
 This indicator measures discrimination, powerlessness, ethnic violence, communal violence, sectarian violence, 
and religious violence. 
4
 This indicator measures internal conflict, small arms proliferation, riots and protesters, fatalities from conflict, 
military coups, rebel activity, militancy, bombings and political prisoners. 
5
 This indicator measures power struggles, defectors, flawed elections, and political competition. 
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resources into impoverishment (Campbell 2011:17). A very heterogeneous society 
in terms of ethnic and religious diversification adds to the complex picture.  
1.1 Purpose of Study and Research Question 
The purpose of this study is to suggest how one can understand the dynamics 
behind peace and conflict within Nigeria by looking at two cases of conflict, the 
North East and the Niger Delta, and one case of peace, the South West. I will 
hence identify independent variables that partake in the explanation, and also 
suggest patterns of how the variables interact in a causal chain. The findings will 
feed back into (sub-disciplines of) the larger theoretical field of what causes 
internal peace and conflict. My research question is: 
 
How can the reasons behind peace and conflict within Nigeria be understood? 
 
All the three cases share a similar setting as being within the Nigerian borders, but 
they show dissimilarity in the outcomes. Some factors could thus be constant 
between all three cases. Still, it could well be the case that the two conflicts have 
emerged partly due to different factors (―equifinality‖ in methodological terms) 
(George and Bennett 2005:235). It can also be the case that the peaceful 
southwestern region shows values similar to the two cases of conflict.  
A contribution that this study makes is that it integrates a case of peacefulness 
within a larger problematic setting and gives an understanding to both internal 
peace and conflict. Also, many studies put their main attention on the insurgents, 
whilst I integrate the role the Nigerian state has in producing the two conflicts 
within its country. 
1.2 North East: Boko Haram 
On May 14, 2013, Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan declared state of 
emergency in the three northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. He 
admitted that Islamic extremists ―now control some of his nation‘s villages and 
towns‖ (NY Daily News 2013-05-14). On June 18, 2013, Boko Haram declared 
war against vigilante youths in Borno and Yobe, who allegedly aid the security 
forces by identifying their members (Premium Times 2013-06-18). 
The Islamic sect Boko Haram
6
 is the main group fighting the central 
government. Boko Haram is Hausa language and means ―Western education is 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6
 The official full name is: ―Jama‘atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda‘Awati Wal Jihad‖ which translates into 
―Congregation of Followers of the Prophet involved in the Call to Islam and Religious Struggle‖. 
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forbidden‖. It first emerged in 2003 in Yobe and Borno but declined after security 
forces dispersed them. It re-emerged in 2006, primarily in Borno, under the leader 
of Mohammed Yusuf. The main initiating event of Boko Haram happened when 
several leaders were arrested on 25 July 2009, followed by an attempt of freeing 
the leaders the next day. Several hundred Boko Haram members attacked the 
police station where they were held. Clashes between Boko Haram and security 
forces went on the following four days in Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe states. 
Yusuf was captured on 30 July 2009 and was later shot dead in custody. In sum, 
the clashes resulted in 780 bodies buried in mass graves, 29 churches burnt down 
and 28 police officers killed. (ICG 2010:36) 
In recent years, the group has increased its activities primarily in northeastern 
Nigeria. It wants to establish a ―pure‖ Islamic state in the North of the country7 by 
applying a strict interpretation of Shari‘a law. The sect rose international media 
attention when it in August 2011 bombed the United Nations compound in the 
capital of Abuja, leaving 23 people dead. Since then, bombings and attacks on 
targets that are perceived to represent the ―west‖ or the corrupt state of Nigeria, 
such as churches, public schools and security forces have in periods been done 
almost weekly (Walker 2012:2,6; ICG 2010:36). Although Boko Haram‘s violent 
activity reaches much of the North and even beyond, it is mostly carried out in the 
two northeastern states of Borno and Yobe (acleddata.com/data/Africa). Since the 
North East is representing the gravity of the violence, I focus my attention on this 
region. 
1.3 Niger Delta: MEND 
MEND (the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) is a militant 
umbrella organization that consists of armed gangs that primarily attack oil fields, 
pipelines, security forces and also kidnap oil workers. The group was created in 
2006 as a reaction to the impoverishment of the local communities in the Niger 
Delta. This is where 75 percent of Nigeria‘s petroleum production and exports 
originates from. The oil accounts for at least 80 percent of the federal revenue and 
90 percent of export earnings (Obi and Rustad 2011:4). Federal revenue must not 
to be confused with the state budget: the oil sector contributes around 15 percent 
to the GDP (first quarter 2013) (National Bureau of Statistics). Also, 95 percent of 
the oil is produced by subsidiaries of multinational oil companies on contracts 
signed by Nigeria‘s oil Minister under the authorization of the 1969 Petroleum 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7
 States where Shari‘a is instituted as criminal law are Zamfara, Kano, Sokoto, Katsina, Bauchi, Borno, Jigawa, 
Kebbi and Yobe. States where Shari‘a is instituted partly are Kaduna, Niger and Gombe. (Ostein, 2007; 
Okpanachi 2011:897). 
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Act
8
. The people of the Niger Delta are thus not authorized to control the 
administration of the oil wealth. The harsh situation of the local population is 
further exacerbated because the oil and gas extraction contaminate the lands and 
waters and destroys livelihoods such as farming and fishing. (Bøås 2011:115; Obi 
and Rustad 2011:3; Meredith 2011:544) 
MEND‘s violent activity has declined since 2009 due to an amnesty program 
which led to the disarmament of thousands of troops. The trend seems to be that 
the conflict has declined but recent attacks suggest that the group has 
reconstituted. (El-Choureiry et al 2012:1) I will have reasons to come back to the 
assessment of the amnesty program. MEND‘s activity is mainly concentrated to 
the states Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers.   
1.4 South West: OPC 
The states included in the geopolitical zone of ―South West‖ are Lagos, Ogun, 
Oyo, Osun, Ondo and Ekiti states. The metropolis and coastal city of Lagos has 
close to 18 million inhabitants (Lagos State Governance), and is also the former 
capital of Nigeria. In 1991, the political capital moved to Abuja but Lagos is still 
the economic capital of Nigeria. 
This region is one of the most peaceful in Nigeria today. Although, OPC 
(O‘odua People‘s Congress), a Yoruba advocacy group, was militantly active here 
mainly between 1999 and 2006. OPC formed in 1995 and a militant wing split in 
1999 from its non-violent parent organization. Riots and violence occurred in 
Lagos city, where police installations were attacked during the post-1999 election 
period. OPC found the elections unjust and marred with voting irregularities. The 
militant leader, Gani Adams, was forced into hiding after the riots and has since 
been captured and released several times. (NCSTRT)  
I will not put as much emphasis on the OPC as compared to Boko Haram and 
MEND. The reason is that OPC is not as violent as the other two organizations. 
My approach is to treat the South West as the peaceful case, but to not mention 
OPC would be unfair.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8
 The Decree No. 51/Petroluem Act of 1969 provides that ‖the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, 
under or upon any lands […] shall be invested in the State‖ and that the federal oil Minister has the sole right to 
grant oil mining leases to oil companies. 
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1.5 Material 
For the theoretical chapter, I primarily draw upon a range of scholars on different 
causes of internal conflict and also on Ted Robert Gurr‘s (2007) theory on how 
one can analyze why insurgency emerge from communal groups.  
The most notable material on methodology within the social sciences that I 
have used are Patrick Thaddeus Jackson‘s (2011) book ―The Conduct of Inquiry 
in International Relations‖, ―Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences‖ by George and Bennett (2005), ―Metodpraktikan‖ by Esaiasson et al 
(2012), ―Att fråga och att svara‖ by Teorell and Svensson (2007), ―Case Study 
Research‖ by Yin (2007). For the section on interview method, I have 
complemented the abovementioned with ―Intervjumetodik‖ by Lantz (2007) and 
―Den Kvalitativa Forskningsintervjun‖ by Kvale and Brinkmann (2012). 
My empirical material are mainly drawn from 20 interviews (over 19 hours of 
recorded material) I did on an eight week field work in Abuja
9
, the capital of 
Nigeria, in the spring of 2013. I could unfortunately not visit large areas in 
Nigeria due to the severe security situation because of the conflicts between the 
state and the insurgents.  
Furthermore, I will employ statistical material on development indicators that 
can be found on the disaggregated – state or regional – level. ACLED (Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Dataset) was very useful since it provides specific 
and comprehensive information on violent events in developing states since 1997. 
Statistics on development indicators was drawn from UNDP (United Nations 
Development Program), National Bureau of Statistics and the World Bank. Falola 
and Heaton‘s (2009) ―A History of Nigeria‖ is a thorough examination of the 
troublesome history of the country. Reports from the ICG (International Crisis 
Group) were of help to get insights on conflict dynamics. Some media reports 
were also drawn upon. Falola and Heaton and ICG were used to triangulate much 
of the interview material in order to reach a fair and reliable description of the 
situation in Nigeria.  
1.6 Definitions 
Several factors partake in the understanding of peace and conflict. Below are 
those that could demand some explanation. How to define concepts are under 
constant theoretical debate in an ―ongoing interpretative battle‖ (Gerring 
1999:359) and universal definitions are seldom found. The below definitions 
capture core elements of the concepts and are useful with regards to this study.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9
 My field work was sponsored by a scholarship from Sida (Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency) called Minor Field Study.  
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Governance – Governance is defined by the World Bank as the way ―power is 
exercised through a country‘s economic, political, and social institutions.‖ Good 
governance is defined by the UNDP as being ―among other things participatory, 
transparent and accountable. It is also effective, equitable and it promotes the rule 
of law.‖ (World Bank) 
 
Accountability – Political accountability refers to the ―responsibility or obligation 
of government officials to act in the best interests of society or face consequences. 
Public officials should be held responsible for their actions.‖ (US Legal) 
 
Impunity – According to the UN, impunity is usually defined as the ―failure to 
punish violations of established norms. It is, in a sense, the act of not being 
punished, hiding from or escaping punishment either due to circumstances or to 
the law‖ (UN 2002). 
 
Corruption – Economic corruption ranges from high level to petty corruption, 
depending on the amount of money being lost, and it is defined by Transparency 
International as ―the abuse of entrusted power for private gain‖ (Transparency 
International 2013). 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Understanding Internal Peace and Conflict 
My study focuses on how peace and conflict within Nigeria can be understood. I 
narrow it to the two most violent insurgent organizations in recent times and the 
most peaceful region, why I get a comprehensive empirical cover. The 
phenomenon of conflict is multi-causal since several independent variables are 
partaking in the explanation, why this theoretical field deals with a range of 
factors. Isolating one explaining variable is seldom applicable within the social 
sciences. This leads me to an approach of applying several independent variables 
found within the larger theoretical branch that aim to understand causes of 
internal peace and conflict. I will in this chapter sketch out such applicable 
factors. In sum, the reasons for presenting a range of factors are because 1) the 
phenomena is multi-causal and 2) it is a step towards describing the variance 
between factors and outcomes (see variable scheme, section 2.2). 
How can Nigeria be understood, or, what is it a case of? In methodological 
terms, what theoretical delimitations can be made, or what independent variables 
or factors should one set focus upon? This question is essential to answer in order 
to know what theories to apply. First, since this study focuses on causes behind 
internal peace and conflict, theories are primarily drawn from internal affairs. 
Second, the answer to what internal aspects are of most relevance gives a clear 
theoretical focus.  
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carlton University, 
produces risk assessment reports named ―Country Indicators for Foreign Policy‖. 
The report on Nigeria lists several key risk indicators that help define what to 
focus attention on. The indicators are: history of armed conflict; governance and 
political instability; militarization; population heterogeneity; demographic stress; 
economic performance; human development; environmental stress; and 
international linkages. (El-Choueiry et al. 2012) The nine indicators provide an 
overview of the situation and together with an initial overview of the theoretical 
field of why insurgency emerges, I was able to construct a checklist of 
independent variables (section 9.1) that could partake in the explanation behind 
the different outcomes.  
2.1.1 The Transitional Phase 
Nigeria has in modern times undergone at least two transitions. First, the British 
colonial rule ended in 1960 and a long period of military dictatorships plagued the 
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post-independence period. Second, the country went from military to democratic 
civilian rule in 1999. States in transition from military to civilian rule often have 
weak and/or nascent political institutions that are unable to accommodate popular 
participation. Professors Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder states that 
statistical evidence covering the past two centuries shows states in the transitional 
phase of democratization are ―more aggressive and war prone, not less‖. ―This 
danger is greatest when states embark on a transition prematurely, when they lack 
the strong political institutions that are needed to make democracy work‖. When 
an old regime breaks down and mass politics begins, the nascent democratic 
procedures are often subject to manipulation by both rising and declining elites. 
Turbulence is hard to avoid if not the country inherits strong political institutions 
that accommodates the democratic transition. (Mansfield and Snyder 2007:161, 
163) 
 
Governing a society that is democratizing is like driving a car while throwing away 
the steering wheel, stepping on the gas, and fighting over which passenger will be in 
the driver‘s seat. (Mansfield and Snyder 2007:169)  
 
What the authors vividly describes is that democratization often takes place in a 
society with weak central authority, unstable coalitions and high-energy mass 
politics. Militarism is often promoted since this strengthens the position of the 
central authority. (Mansfield and Snyder 2007:169) Transitions marred with elite 
power centralization and marginalization of disempowered groups can cement 
conflict dynamics such as power asymmetries (see Van Wyk 2007; Lindeman 
2008; DFID 2009). 
The mobilization of mass support takes place in a highly competitive setting 
and it is thus difficult for a single elite group to control the transitional outcome. 
A transitional sequence that could be preferable is if institution building can be 
made before mass democratization is introduced. (Mansfield and Snyder 
2007:171f)  
 
All too often, however, building the needed institutions has proven exceedingly 
difficult. Where many citizens are illiterate, per capita income is low, society is 
ethnically divided, religious sects or other illiberal groups dominate civil society, 
powerful spoiler fear democracy, nationalist mythmakers control the media, and/or 
oil revenue makes the state unaccountable to taxpayers, the path to democratization 
is likely to be neither smooth nor peaceful. (Mansfield and Snyder 2007:173) 
 
Mansfield and Snyder‘s findings are on high level of abstraction/generality, 
therefore I will supplement them with specific claims: Ted Robert Gurr‘s theory 
on why insurgencies emerge will be applied. 
Gurr argues that the trend of more internal conflicts since the end of the Cold 
War is an indirect consequence of a modernization process. First, 
postrevolutionary states have been focused on consolidating power which has 
meant assimilation of minorities and extraction of local resources for the use of 
the state. The result in practice is often strengthened central power, inability of 
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other groups to withhold autonomy or to participate meaningfully in the power at 
the center and group grievances. Second, the utilization of untapped human and 
natural resources have benefited some at the expense of others. ―Ethnoclasses‖ 
has become visible as a phenomenon. (2007:135) 
The economic incorporation of lands, forests and natural resources into the 
realm of the state has meant sharp reactions from peoples that are dependent on 
such resources. Third, an implication of modernization is that people migrate at a 
larger scale. (Gurr 2007:135) Migrants (both domestic and international) can 
contribute to economic growth in the new area of living but can also pose a threat 
since more people have to compete over limited resources. Demographic stress 
can follow from high population density. Diaspora groups can also indirectly fuel 
violence by sending support to one or another faction in the conflict. (Gurr 
2007:135; El-Choueiry et al. 2012:2) 
2.1.2 Governance and Political Instability  
Taydas et. al. argues that it is ―essential to broaden our understanding of state 
capacity and shift the dominant approach from being rebel-centric to one that 
focuses not only on both rebels and the state but also their interactions‖ 
(2010:209). An equitable and distributive spending of public revenues that is freed 
from the scourge of corruption is likely to produce a legitimate social contract (see 
Murshed & Tadjoeddin 2009; Addison et. al. 2008; Le Billon 2003). Low 
institutional quality, for example high level of corruption in government, low 
respect of rule of law and a poor-quality bureaucratic system ―can cause states to 
lose the loyalty and support of their citizens and consequently fall prey to civil 
war‖ (Taydas et. al. 2010:196) since institutions can favor certain subgroups 
instead of the larger population (2010:211f).  
 
Increasing adherence to the rule of law, reducing corruption and building more 
efficient bureaucratic and legal systems might mitigate the grievances of the 
citizens, increase credibility of the government and thereby discourage rebellion. 
(Taydas et. al. 2010:212) 
 
High income inequality; economic mismanagement and corruptive behavior that 
benefits the political elite, the military or certain subgroups creates a dynamic 
more prone to conflict over the distribution of resources. The political elite in a 
strong state that has vast resources do not necessarily need to be very responsive 
to the will of the people. Imposing administrative structures, which can be done at 
a relatively low cost, can favor people unequal with the effect of marginalization. 
(Gurr 2007:145) 
Natural resource rents that are unfairly shared can be a source of grievances 
and secessionist movements. It is essential to account for both horizontal and 
vertical inequalities. The former defines the relative inequalities between identity 
groups that over time can result in ethnic conflicts. The latter defines the relative 
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inequalities between the elite and the population (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 
2009:99f), often measured with the Gini Index.  
2.1.3 Heterogeneous Identities 
Identity inequality can accelerate a conflict (see Lake and Rothchild 1996), 
especially when economic and political inequality coincide with ethnic or 
religious fault lines, and when political channels are not usable to pursue your 
ethnic rights or interests (1996:43; Gurr 2007:145) 
Conflicts between states have since the end of the Cold War largely been 
replaced by internal conflicts often termed protracted ―ethnonational‖ or 
―communal‖ conflicts. (see Connor 1994; Shultz and Dew 2006:30). 
Contemporary conflicts are often fought between ethnic, religious, linguistic, and 
national groups within states. It is important to bear in mind that these attributes 
are only what defines the different groups and cannot be viewed as underlying 
causes to conflicts. Factors such as discrimination, inequality, corruption and 
repression are essential in internal conflicts. Groups in divided societies within 
weak or failing states often turn inwards to their respective identity. This leads to 
a setting of differentiation, defined by the sociopolitical order and a struggle 
between the identity groups to control the distribution of state resources (Shultz 
and Dew 2006:29f,32). State security forces are often fought against: 
 
Minority groups in such situations come to see differences with their ruling ethnic 
counterparts as irreconcilable. Discriminatory and repressive state policies often led 
those groups to resort to violence and warfare. (Shultz and Dew 2006:32) 
 
Gurr also elaborates upon this type of conflict, although using the wider term 
―communal violence‖ (Gurr 2007:134).  
2.1.4 Why Insurgency Emerge 
Gurr provides a theoretical understanding of why groups go from being 
communal identity groups to emerge as politically motivated rebel groups. He 
does so by dealing with four general factors. By showing how the factors are 
activated by the characteristics and circumstances of the communal (or 
ethnonational) identity groups, an analysis of how to understand why political 
rebel groups (insurgency will be used interchangeably) emerge can be made. The 
four main factors, as presented by Gurr, are: 
 
1) the salience of ethnocultural identity for members and leaders of the group,  
2) the extent to which the group has collective incentives for political action,  
3) the extent of the group‘s capacities for collective action and  
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4) the availability of opportunities in the group‘s political environment that 
increase its chances of attaining group objectives through political action. 
(Gurr 2007:136).  
 
(1) The logic behind the first main factor is that the more salient the 
ethnocultural (or ethnonational) identity is, the more likely the group is to define 
their interest in such terms and the easier it is for leaders to mobilize a group for 
collective action. Whether the demarcation is defined by common descent, 
experience, language, or belief is not the central point to be made. The 
demarcation based on identity and the salience and duration of it is central.  
 
The basic argument is that the salience of ethnocultural identity depends on how 
much difference it makes in people‘s lives. If a communal group is treated 
differently, by denial or privilege, its members will become more self-conscious 
about their common bonds and interests. Minimize difference, and communal 
identity becomes less significant as a unifying force. (Gurr 2007:138) 
 
The above citation is a crucial analytic tool that helps one to understand how 
important identity can be. The comparatively advantaged group will resist 
communal challenges and the identity of the disadvantageous group is salient 
because of the invidious distinction (status, economic well-being and access to 
political power that are maintained by advantaged groups). Leaders of 
disadvantaged groups often increase the salience of group identity by referring to 
―historical memories and symbols of victimization‖. (Gurr 2007:138f; Rouhana 
and Bar-Tal 1998:761f) 
(2) Incentives for political action, the second main factor listed above, can be 
separated into three aspects which are relative group positions, loss of political 
autonomy and repression. The first aspect – relative group positions – is described 
as ―resentment about losses suffered in the past, fear of future losses, and hopes 
for relative gains‖ (Gurr 2007: 139). This depends on changing relative positions 
between the different identity groups among which advantages and disadvantages 
are distributed. Disadvantages are here defined as ―socially derived inequalities in 
material well-being, political access, or cultural status by comparison with other 
social groups‖ (Gurr 2007:139) Discrimination can be seen economically, 
politically and culturally. If inequalities are upheld by discriminatory policies, the 
affected minorities have a clear incentive to focus their resentment on those 
imposing or upholding the discrimination. The second aspect – loss of political 
autonomy – can inspire a goal of restoration of the previous autonomy. The sense 
of regaining the right to self-determination is central here. The third aspect – 
repression – means that force that are used (or perceived to be used) unjust can in 
the long term provoke an incentive to resist and retaliate. (Gurr 2007:140) 
These incentives can spark violent resistance or rebel actions, which in turn 
can lead to more repression and a more disadvantaged position. What comes into 
play is a cycle of retaliation, a dynamic that can cement the protractedness of the 
conflict. (Gurr 2007:140) 
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(3) The groups‘ capacities for collective action, the third main factor listed 
above, are defined by the level of cohesion and mobilization of the identity 
groups. Cohesive groups are held together by a dense network of high interaction. 
Mobilization refers to the ways in which members are recruited and motivated to 
take action. A high level of cohesion and mobilization defines the frequency and 
sustainability of the political action. The sense of collective identity helps 
mobilization, which is why the framing of a collective identity is essential. A 
conjunction of shared incentives and a strong sense of group identity is a potent 
setting for political action. (Gurr 2007:141) 
The following four aspects help to define the capacity for collective actions. 
The logic behind the first, geographic concentration, is that rebellion is facilitated 
by a rural territorial base. Gurr refers to a large-N study (see Monica Duffy Toft 
2004) which states that out of 72 ethnic based wars since 1945, 88 percent of the 
groups are geographically concentrated. This is also confirmed in a study (see 
Fearon and Laitin 1999) which states that geographic concentration increased the 
risk of rebellion in all world regions. The risk of rebellion decreases if the group 
instead is highly dispersed or urban. (Gurr 2007:142) 
The second aspect is preexisting organization. The logic is that political rebel 
movements are more easily built if cohesion exists – for example in terms of 
preexisting features such a common religion, a shared economic situation and a 
common political situation. (Gurr 2007:142) 
The third aspect is overcoming faction, forging coalitions which points to the 
width of an organized rebel coalition. If loyalties can cross-cut small groupings 
such as clans, tribes, classes and local communities, a more inclusive coalition is 
built. The features listed above, a common religion, shared economic situation and 
common political situation have a wide scope in which different clans and classes 
are incorporated. It is therefore strategic to allude to such a scope of identity, in 
order to overcome smaller factions and form a larger coalition. (Gurr 2007:142) 
The fourth aspect that Gurr presents is authenticity of leadership. ―Communal 
leaders are authentic if they are seen as representing the most essential values and 
aspirations of the group and if their actions are thought to be in the common 
interest‖ (Gurr 2007:143). Such leaders can more easily than other take control, 
command loyalties, symbolize the group‘s identity and articulate the group‘s 
interests and demands. (Gurr 2007:143)  
(4) The availability of opportunities, the fourth factor listed above, can be 
separated into durable and sudden opportunities. Durable factors such as the 
character of the state and its resource distribution shape a long-term situation for a 
disadvantaged group. Sudden shifts in political alliances and policies can imply a 
situation that groups can take swift advantages of. International support, however 
durable or sudden, can strengthen the capacities of the groups. (Gurr 2007:144) 
In sum, factors such as weak political institutions, economic inequality, 
marginalization of disempowered groups, poverty and corruption could all play a 
part in the explanation of internal conflicts - especially when coinciding with 
identity lines. Gurr‘s theory gives also an understanding of factors that could be 
crucial in the explanation of why identity groups rebel. I will use these factors in 
my analysis (section 5.1) on how to understand the different outcomes within 
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Nigeria. Knowing how these factors co-vary with the different outcomes is 
essential to get a fair understanding. 
2.2 Comparative Analytic Apparatus 
I present my list of variables below (to see how they were selected, see section 
3.2.1.). They form a scheme that will describe the correlations between the 
independent and the dependent variable (DV). All cases are posed with the same 
variables. The cells yet to be filled in will contain the results that I derive from my 
empirical material. Constant variables (CV) on the country level are describing 
the overall context in which my three cases are found. 
The independent variables (IV) vary between the cases with the different 
scores ―low‖, ―medium‖ and ―high‖. The number of categories defines parsimony 
contra richness. Fewer categories lead to more parsimony, where dichotomous 
categories are on the one extreme. I avoid this by using three categories. The three 
labels of ―low‖, ―medium‖ and ―high‖ eases the description of variance and a 
more nuanced analysis is enabled. (See discussion in George and Bennett 
2005:85) I describe how I code the independent variable into these operational 
definitions in Appendix C, section 10.1.  
By using three categories I can differentiate between my three cases. For 
example, unemployment will vary as follows: North East: high, Niger Delta: 
medium and South West: low. If I were to use only two categories, it would be 
impossible to separate the cases in such a way. Since a variation in the 
independent variables is crucial in comparative studies, I find it suitable to use 
three categories. Likewise, I do not need for example five categories since I can 
differentiate between my three cases by using three categories.  
 
Variables CV 1 CV 2 CV 3  CV 4  CV 5 IV 1 IV 2 IV 3 IV 4 IV 5 IV 6 DV (conflict) 
Cases 
            
North East 
           
Yes, High 
Niger Delta 
           
Yes, Medium 
South West 
           
No, Low 
 
Constant variables: 
CV 1 – Bad governance 
CV 2 – Weak accountability 
CV 3 – Impunity 
CV 4 – Corruption 
CV 5 – Economic inequality 
 
Independent variables: 
IV 1 – Poverty 
IV 2 – Non-education 
IV 3 – Unemployment 
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IV 4 – Salience of youth unemployment 
 
Intervening variables: 
IV 5 – Salience of religious identity 
IV 6 – Salience of environmental degradation 
 
Dependent variable 
DV – Conflict  
 
All variables are deliberately constructed so that a low score is preferable.  
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3 Method 
Since my study is a comparative study with few cases, I draw upon both case and 
comparative study designs. My empirics are mainly extracted from interview 
material collected between April 17 and June 3, 2013 on a field study in Abuja, 
why I lay out methodological considerations on interviewing as well as coding of 
this material (Appendix C, section 10.2). An interview structure (Appendix B) as 
well as the coding of variables (Appendix C 10.1) is added. 
3.1 Theory of Science 
Trying to scrutinize an investigation correctly becomes impossible if the 
researcher does not make some considerations about theory of science, why I here 
lay out such considerations. 
Considering the relationship between the world and the researcher is essential. 
The debate is about if the researcher and the world is seen as separable (dualism) 
or inseparable (monism) from each other. This first wager ―locates and specifies 
three things: the researcher [subject], the world to be researched [object], and the 
character of the relationship between them‖ [dualism or monism]. (Jackson 
2011:34) The mind-world dualism claims to reach knowledge about a world that 
exists independent of us, and empirics and theories are easily bridgeable (the 
researcher is ‗recording‘ the world). Knowledge is speaking about the independent 
world. The mind-world monism sees the speaking about an independent world as 
nonsensical, since the researcher and the world are dependent of each other. 
Knowledge comes from a unified mind-world entity. (Jackson 2011:35f)  
Another dividing characteristic is between dualism; un-contingent 
(discovering general laws) and monism; contingent knowledge (the ‗truth‘ is ever 
to be pending). General and un-contingent laws are seen as objectivism, where the 
need for intersubjectivity logically is downplayed due to the claim of objectivity. 
Contingent knowledge is hence based on a more thorough intersubjectivity, 
because knowledge deduced from premises must be attainable for others. A 
dividing line is hence between objectivity (dualism) and intersubjectivity 
(monism) as solutions to the problem of how to attain ―common conceptual 
space‖. (Jackson 2011:39) 
The second wager is between phenomenalism and transfactualism. 
Phenomenalism sees the observable as the basis of knowledge. Transfactualism 
goes beyond observable features in order to establish a relationship between them. 
Thus, correlations are observed using phenomenological methodology; causalities 
are transfactually constructed to make sense of correlations. The aim of explaining 
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mechanisms is hence a transfactual undertaking. A dividing line is between if the 
purpose of the research is to describe the world‘s phenomena, or if the purpose is 
to transfactually explain if and how phenomena relate to each other. (Jackson 
2011:37) 
The two wagers put together forms the below four field matrix (Jackson 
2011:37).  
Given the brief considerations above, I place my study mainly in the bottom-right 
cell of the four field matrix. Reflexivity is the combination of monism 
(contingency) and transfactualism (transfactual explanations). Intersubjectivity is 
the key to gain contingent understanding of the world since the world is reflected 
in how we perceive it. Knowledge is regarded as dependent on the considerations 
the researcher makes (Jackson 2011:159) and my conclusions will inevitably be 
contingent on my methodological considerations. Intersubjectivity must therefore 
be thoroughly applied in this study. 
Theory is needed since my aim is to explain how we can understand the 
reasons behind different outcomes. The importance of theory is basically that it is 
what holds phenomena (independent and dependent variable) together. 
Theoretical, deductible, claims are therefore needed to transfactually relate 
phenomena to each other, i.e. to make suggestions on how they could be 
understood to interact causally. If my study was more inductively focused, it 
could possibly be found in the ―phenomenalism‖ side of the horizontal axis. 
The below four field matrix describes the researcher [subject], the world to be 
researched [object], and the character of the relationship between them‖ [dualism 
or monism]. Only neopositivism claims objectivity and is hence freed from 
quotation marks [―‖], whereas the others recognize some degree of subjectivity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
21 
 
 
With regards to reflexivity, the subject (―S‖) is a function of the mind-dependent 
world (―O‖). Since monism is present, empirical claims are expressing values 
(Jackson 2011:168), dependent on which standpoint the empirical claim stems 
from. The world (―O‖) would be more correctly understood if several standpoints 
partook in the knowledge production (―S‖). The mechanisms (―M‖) at work are 
standpoints/contexts, if these are not countered with other standpoints, only partial 
knowledge will be produced.  
As a researcher I am dependent on the world and more specifically, the 
subjective interpretation the informants give to me. This is why I interview a 
range of different people and also triangulate with other empirical material. I am 
therefore not dependent on a limited number of standpoints. The knowledge that is 
produces in this study is also dependent (contingent) on my methodological 
choices. All dependencies my study relies upon must be clearly stated, why I 
present the theoretical field and my analytical apparatus, who I interview and 
how, my methodological choices and how I code the variables (operational 
definitions) as well as the interview material.  
3.2 Design of Study: an Overview 
Comparative studies can be differentiated into comparative case studies, focused 
studies and statistical studies. These are differentiated by 1) the balance between 
the number of factors and the number of cases and 2) the balance between 
explanation and generalization. (Denk 2002:34f). This can easily be illustrated in 
a graph that describes the correlation between the balances.  
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Graph describing the balances between: 
1) Number of independent variables and Number of cases,  
2) Explanation and Generalization and  
3) Number of temporal units and Number of spatial units. 
 
The above graph shows the balance between three core considerations that are 
essential in the design of a comparative study (see Denk 2002:34f,37). In practice, 
the researcher has to make limitations. First, one cannot study all independent 
variables in all cases; second, aiming at both explanation and generalization of a 
phenomena under investigation would be hard (would require a lot of time and 
resources); and third, how one chooses between a longitudinal analysis (number 
of temporal units) or a spatial analysis (number of cases). My study is a ―focused 
study‖ since it deals with few cases and that one central aspect – the explanation 
behind the dependent variable – is under investigation (Denk 2002:42) 
By looking at the horizontal axis of the graph, my study is limited in the 
number of cases (or number of spatial units), and three cases will also limit the 
possibilities of generalizing my results to other cases outside Nigeria (the focus is 
in fact kept within Nigeria). By looking at the vertical axis of the graph, my study 
can be understood as investigating a relatively high number of independent 
variables which also allows one to pay more attention to the explanation (by 
applying theories that suggests how variables interact). The temporal aspect is 
basically defined by my aim to understand the reasons behind the current (year 
2013) situation in Nigeria in terms of internal peace and conflict. Since reasons 
behind the current situation can be traced back in history, it hard to situate the 
blue ―X‖ on the vertical axis at a precise level. In practice, I will mainly deal with 
the contemporary, post-colonial history of Nigeria with emphasis on recent years 
up to 2013.  
My empirical material consists mainly of more than 19 hours of interview 
material I gathered in the capital of Abuja. My aim is to thoroughly triangulate 
with other empirical material such as statistics, media- and academic articles.  
In order to be able to analyze, I apply a set of constant and independent 
variables and the variance among them is used to draw conclusions.  
My methodological design in sum: 
 
Design of study 
 
Puzzle Different outcomes within the same 
country 
 
Research question How can the reasons behind 
peace and conflict within Nigeria 
be understood? 
 
What phenomena are under investigation? Internal peace and conflict 
 
What objects are under investigation? Insurgent/rebel organizations 
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What cases are under investigation?  North East,  
Niger Delta,  
South West 
 
What time period is under investigation? Contemporary history, post-
independence (1960) with an emphasis 
on recent years up to 2013. 
 
How do I collect my material?  Field study interviews, 
Disaggregated statistical data on 
development indicators, 
    Academic reports, 
    Media reports 
 
Analytical categories   Constant variables,  
Independent variables, 
Intervening variables, 
Dependent variable 
 
Describing the variance Coding procedure of statistical and 
qualitative interview material 
 
Analysis Correlation between and interaction 
(causal chain) among variables, 
 ‗Merging‘ theory and empirics 
3.2.1 Considerations on Case Study: the Importance of Variables 
George and Bennett propose five tasks to fulfill when conducting case study 
research. The first and most important task is to formulate the research objectives. 
(George and Bennett 2005:69,74) My objective is to suggest how one can 
understand the reasons behind peace and conflict in my three cases, why the 
application of theoretical variables on the empirical material is needed. What 
values my variables gets will show how they correlate. Since I collected interview 
material, this will uncover how they are linked together, and a type of causal
10
 
suggestion can be made. 
The second task is to specify the relevant variables for the investigation. The 
variables that I will apply in this study are listed in section 2.2. The researcher 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
10
 I will not be able to make an experiment-type of research due to the almost impossibility of isolating one 
explaining variable within social sciences. I will not present the exact causes behind peace and conflict, but 
suggest how one can understand the reasons behind it. 
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must specify what variables are dependent, independent, intervening and constant. 
(George and Bennett 2005:79)  
First, the dependent variable is the level of conflict. Since I have cases with 
different outcomes, it is reasonable that I find variance in the independent 
variables that account for that difference in outcome (George and Bennett 
2005:80; Esaiasson et al 2012:101ff). Showing the dependent variable in the same 
categories – low, medium and high – enables both variance and comparability. 
Comparisons require application of the same variables towards all cases (a 
―controlled comparison‖) and since I apply the logic of both equifinality (same 
outcome) and in-equifinality (different outcome), I can approach the puzzle from 
both ways (Esaiasson et al 2012:103; George and Bennett 2005:235). Assuming 
that the two cases of conflict show similar values in a few independent variables, 
and if at the same time the case with no conflict shows other values in the same 
few independent variables, the conclusion would be that these independent 
variables should contain explanatory power.  
Second, my independent variables are seen in section 2.2. This list was longer 
before and during I did my field work (see Appendix A, section 9.1) as I wanted 
to avoid to limit my scope since this could result in important variables gone 
undetected (Esaiasson et al 2012:220). The empirical material was thus not 
constrained by a limited set of independent variables. The risk assessment report 
on Nigeria and a brief overview of the theoretical field on causes of internal 
conflict provided me with this initial palette of factors that could partake in an 
explanation. The interview material then guided me to set focus on the most 
notable issues in Nigeria with regards to my cases and the focus of internal peace 
and conflict, which is why the checklist of independent variables was reduced. 
Methodologically speaking, a combination of a deductive and an inductive 
approach was applied. 
The aim of my field research was to collect material useful to answer my 
overall research question. What I asked the informants depended on their area of 
expertise and every interview added one piece to the puzzle. Derived from my 
questions and the answers I got – what the interview objects said, how they 
described different aspects (variables) and the importance they ascribed to them, I 
was able to set focus on the most relevant independent variables and also link the 
independent variables with the dependent variable. I first establish correlations 
between variables before I discuss how they interact with each other. How the 
variables relate to each other in a casual chain cannot be known in beforehand. 
The empirical material will have to define this, or, to use the words of George and 
Bennett: ―…the investigator is more likely to develop sensitive ways of describing 
variance in the variables after he or she has become familiar with how they vary in 
the…cases examined‖ (2005: 84) It is thus important that the researcher is not 
limited but instead open to new variables that he or she can come across along the 
field research (2005:99). 
The intervening variables are those that are very specific to the cases, for 
example the role of religion in the North East and the environmental degradation 
in the Niger Delta. See section 2.2. 
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Constant variables are used in within-case comparisons. These describe the 
overall Nigerian context in which my cases are found. Constant variables do not 
contain explanatory power but are of importance since they provide the same 
context within which the cases differ, something that enables stronger conclusions 
(more on this in the next section). 
The third task is to select cases. I have selected cases with different outcome 
on the dependent variable. This strategy enables me to look at both similarity and 
dissimilarity in the covariation between variables. I have selected cases on the 
extremes, which is accordance with Esaiasson‘s recommendation to select cases 
with strong variation on the dependent variable in order to understand the causal 
relationship correctly (2012:103; Denk 2002:47f). The two conflicts I have 
selected are the most violent in recent times in Nigeria and both militant 
organizations have the Nigerian state as the counterpart. The South West is 
considered as a peaceful area in the sense that it is freed from organized 
insurgency. Another serious conflict is between indigenous people (native 
farmers, predominantly Christians of the Berom tribe) and settlers (nomadic 
pasteuralists, predominantly Muslims of the Hausa tribe) in the middle-belt of the 
county, in and around the city of Jos, Plateau state. This ethnic-religious conflict 
is inter-communal, hence not having the state as the counterpart. If I were to add 
the case of the Jos conflict, I would have encountered the problem of comparing 
cases with different contexts (conflicts with and without the Nigerian state as the 
counterpart) and it would hence be difficult to draw any meaningful conclusion 
other than the cases differ in the independent variables, as in accordance with 
Esaiasson. A within-case selection of two cases that both have the Nigerian state 
as the counterpart is meant to lay bare dynamics that involves the role of the state. 
Certain characteristics should therefore be similar in my two cases of conflict. 
The fourth task is to describe the variance in the variables (George and 
Bennett 2005:84f). The reason is that conclusions drawn from comparisons 
require differentiation among the independent variables. I will use three categories 
in which I describe the differentiation among the independent variables; low, 
medium and high. I will present them as relative to each other and not in absolute 
terms. Also, it would be unrealistic to form the values into absolute terms since 
some are extracted from qualitative interview material. This is why I also used 
disaggregated (state or regional-level) statistics to form values on independent 
variables.  
The fifth task is to formulate data requirements (also Yin 2007:40,47f). 
Disaggregated statistics on state or regional level corresponds with my cases and 
are useful to form values on certain independent variables. Qualitative interview 
material is useful to understand how variables can relate to each other, as in 
accordance with Lijphart‘s definition below. 
3.2.2 Considerations on Comparative Study: Within-Case Approach 
Arend Lijphart defines the comparative method as a ―method of discovering 
empirical relationships among variables‖ (1971:683) and the basis of the method 
  
26 
 
of comparison is straightforward. Comparisons must be structured and focused. 
First, it is structured when it employs a standardized data collection to each case. 
―This is a way of standardizing data requirements so that comparable data will be 
obtained from each case.‖ (George and Bennett 2005:86) It is harder to acquire 
cumulative development of knowledge in cross-case approaches since this 
―involves constructing an explanation for each case singly‖ (May 2011:236) that 
could rely on several methodological procedures and data collections and would 
be found among different contexts. A within-case approach with the application of 
the same variables to all three cases solves this problem. Second, a comparison is 
focused when it investigates a certain aspect (the dependent variable) of the cases 
that are of theoretical relevance under the overall research objective. (George and 
Bennett 2005:67,69) 
A reasonable way to understand reasons behind phenomena is to first present 
the empirics on how my cases perform on the independent variables and 
dependent variable, second to establish correlations (section 5.1) among the 
variables and third, to discuss which independent variables accidentally coincide 
with the dependent variable and which play an integral part in a causal chain
11
 
leading up to different outcomes (section 5.2). My aim is not to suggest the exact 
causes behind the different outcomes, but to suggest how one can understand the 
reasons behind the different outcomes.  
The ―controlled comparison‖, as labeled by George and Bennett (Denk 2002 
uses ―focused study‖), is a study with two or a few cases that resemble the 
conditions of a scientific experiment which ―enables the investigator to make use 
of experimental logic to draw causal inferences‖ (2005:151). Causal inference 
requires the cases to be the same in every respect but one in order to explain the 
difference in outcome. This is only an ideal methodological situation that is 
―extremely difficult to find‖ (2005:152,24) and should only be used as a 
theoretical point of reference. The basic logic for suggesting explanations to 
phenomena is to look at correlation between variables, whether it is to explain 
similar or dissimilar outcomes. Since the outcomes are multi-causal, I cannot 
isolate one explaining variable in an experiment-type of way.  
The big advantage of within-case comparisons is that it is possible to come to 
more secure conclusions since they share the same context (constant variables are 
shared among all cases), something that is not possible in a cross-case analysis. It 
is hence easier to control for possible causal factors (Esaiasson et al 2012:108). 
This resembles a most similar systems design – the idea is that different values on 
independent variables explain different outcomes. The more the cases are similar, 
the better possibility it is to explain with those few variables that are dissimilar 
(Denk 2002:43).  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11
 I deliberately use the term ―causal chain‖ instead of ―causal effect‖. The reason is that my empirics point at a 
multi-causal situation behind the dependent variable. A clear causal effect would need more of an experimental-
type of causality where the researcher can isolate one explaining variable, everything else being the same. 
Synonyms to ―causal chain‖ are ―chain of events‖ (Esaiasson et. al. 2007:257), ―chain of evidence‖ (May 
2011:235) and ―causal paths‖ (George and Bennett 2005:235).  
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A concept with respect to the explanations of similar outcomes is 
―equifinality‖, namely ―the fact that different causal explanations often exist for 
similar outcomes‖ (George and Bennett 2005:152). This must be taken into 
account in order not to suggest a misunderstanding of the reasons behind the 
similar outcomes. Also, my cases that I label similar with internal conflict can of 
course be different in size and characteristics, something an in-depth investigation 
– a field research – will reveal. 
3.2.3 Reasons for Field Research 
In order to understand reasons behind phenomena one must apply theories on the 
micro level. One must ―get closer to the mechanisms or microfoundations behind 
observed phenomena‖, something that requires a field research. (George and 
Bennett 2005:147) Such study takes on an in-depth look at the dynamics behind 
peace and conflict, or, in a theory of science point of view, it reduces the distance 
between the subject and the object. 
One relevant method to use within a field research is to do interviews, which 
is considered as one of the most used within the social sciences. (Esaiasson et al 
2007:257; Teorell and Svensson 2007:89) Asking the interviewees how they 
perceive the different aspects (independent variables) and what they attribute to 
the aspects is crucial in order to get a better understanding. ―A fuller 
understanding can be achieved only by witnessing the context of the event or 
circumstances to which people refer‖ (May 2011:158).  
One major benefit with field research is that you immerse yourself with the 
local context and understanding of events and phenomena, which is why I allow 
my interviewees to speak rather freely and describe the situations in their own 
terms. I must thus be open-minded in order to attain new contextual insights on 
the dynamics behind peace and conflict and I must to an extent free myself from 
preconceived explanations since new insights can bring interesting implications. 
Tentative explanations could be altered and variables could work in other 
directions than previously thought.  
3.3 Semi-structured Interview  
The aim of the research defines the applicable interview structure. There are three 
broad types of interview structure; the structured, the semi-structured and the 
unstructured. There is a thus a quantitative-qualitative continuum with regards to 
structure: if the aim of your study requires quantitative data, you should use the 
structured technique and conversely, if it requires highly qualitative, in-depth data, 
you should use the unstructured technique. (May 2011:132)  
Since my research aim at gaining an understanding to different outcomes, I 
need my interviewees to talk more freely and I can therefore not apply the 
structured interview. The semi-structured interview fits neatly with the aim of my 
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research. By using this technique, I will ―allow people to answer more on their 
own terms than the standardized interview permits, but still provide a greater 
structure for comparability over that of the [...] unstructured interview‖. (May 
2011:135) An essential feature is that I can ask follow-up questions and also ask, 
as I do not want factors to go undetected, if there is anything the interviewee 
wants to add to the picture. This structure enables the informants to clarify and 
elaborate on the statements they make, which is crucial since the most essential 
aim is to gain an understanding of the reasons to different outcomes (May 
2011:134). By also asking the same questions to all cases (for example asking 
how an independent variable performs in all three cases respectively), 
comparability is enabled (May 2011:150). 
Lastly, my aim of using a mixture of informants is consistent with the fact that 
―some interviews will provide more useful information than others‖ (Gerson and 
Horowitz 2002 in May 2011:136) and that an interview is limited to one person‘s 
subjective understanding of the situation. Using a range of different people will 
provide a broad palette of standpoints that all adds to the understanding of the 
issue under investigation (May 2011:136).  
3.3.1 Informants 
Interviews can be distinguished between informant- and respondent interview 
methods. First, the informant interview method aims at finding witnesses to an 
event or phenomena that can tell you how certain aspects fit together. The 
researcher uses informant interviews to get ―the best possible depiction of a chain 
of events‖12 (Esaiasson 2007:257). Different informants give different subjective 
standpoints that add up to the overall understanding. Esaiasson (2007:300) notes 
that when using informant interviews, it is more common to change the interview 
guide dependent on who you interview. Answers given in a former interview lead 
to more specific and refined questions in the next interview. This is why there was 
no purpose of asking the same questions to all informants. The interview material 
should then be checked against other sources (triangulation). (Esaiasson 
2007:258) Since I used informant interviews, I cannot produce a standardized 
interview form. Instead, my checklist of possible independent variables (Appendix 
B, section 9.1) was my main guiding tool defining my data requirements in the 
specific interview setting (see Yin 2007:25). 
In order to obtain (to what extent possible) unbiased interview material, I use a 
wide range of people as my informants (see discussion in Esaiasson et al 
2012:220). I have interviewed ten Nigerians and ten persons from the 
international community. They work for Western Embassies, the UN, the EU, 
local NGOs, local law firms, aid agencies, international newspapers, ministries, 
policy institutes and in the local service sector. They range from analysts, 
diplomats, NGO directors and professional academics to workers in the civil 
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 Swedish original translation: ‖bästa möjliga skildringen av ett händelseförlopp‖.  
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society and the service sector. People that work within the international 
community have an outsider‘s view on the local situation, whereas Nigerians have 
an insider‘s view. What they all have in common is that they have a direct or 
indirect knowledge on issue areas relevant for my investigation.  
In selecting informants, I initially made use of the extensive contact network 
the Embassy of Sweden provided. Considering what actors might have knowledge 
about given the issue at hand (Merriam 1994:91), I contacted those who worked 
within the field of analyzing the state of affairs in Nigeria or could have 
knowledge about certain relevant aspects (independent variables). The snow-ball 
method was thereafter used, i.e. that the informants suggested other people 
relevant to interview (Esaiasson et al 2012:189f). 
3.3.2 Interviewing Issues 
To give the interview object the possibility to be anonymous is always a 
prerequisite (May 2011:152) and 16 out of 20 sources wanted anonymity. I did 
not ask why but a logical reason is that they then were able to speak more freely, 
especially given the worsened security situation in the country
13
. It is also easier 
to acquire permission to record the interview under anonymity. Inter-codar 
reliability is hampered since many informants are undisclosed but it is still 
possible to do if others listen to the recorded material. Having the interviews 
recorded is a major benefit since I can listen to them several, which strengthens 
the intra-codar reliability. (Esaiasson et al 2012:64) If not a recorder was used, I 
would inevitably use my own words in the process of reproducing what was said 
and also miss certain points made by the informants. Trying to write down by 
hand what is said in an interactional process of an interview would neither be fair 
to the interview situation nor the material (May 2011:151f), which is why all 
interviews were recorded. 
The security situation in Nigeria restricts the possibility to travel. I did not feel 
that this implicated much, since most of the international community and a high 
number of local NGOs are located in the political capital, Abuja. Also, a lot of 
their personnel that was previously sent out to the conflict zones are now relocated 
to peaceful areas, many to Abuja. Many of them still cooperate with local field 
staff or partners still working in the affected areas and internationals have paid 
visits with the help of security transports (Interview 4,8,9). It is although 
important to bear in mind that I rely on my informants as I cannot get a first-hand 
look of the conflict areas. It is especially useful with informants from NGOs since 
they in fact are non-governmental and have their purpose to highlight pressing 
features within Nigeria.  
Inevitably, some interviews provided more useful information than others. No 
single interview, however revealing, can offer more than limited insights into 
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 Some informants even stated that they personally knew people that had been killed or kidnapped by the 
militant organizations. It is very understandable that people want anonymity in such a situation.  
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social processes, why a range of informants were interviewed. Only by comparing 
a series of interviews can the significance of any one of them be fully understood. 
And, in the long run, each interview added to the final story. (Gerson and 
Horowitz 2002:211 in May 2011:136) 
A recommendation is to start easy in an interview, for example with questions 
about some simple facts about the current situation, and then move on to harder or 
more specific questions. I formulated my questions so that they were easily 
understood, why questions posed in an academic manner was avoided. (Teorell 
and Svensson 2007:90) For an example of an average interview, see appendix A, 
section 9.1. 
3.4 Squaring the Circle: How to Code the Data 
After the material is obtained, an initial step is to gain a systematic and 
comparable structure of it. This is basically the procedure of breaking down the 
data into 1) understandable text segments which can be summarized with certain 
labeling concepts, key words, categories or variables – and 2) their relation to 
each other (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009:218; Strauss and Corbin 1998:57,66; 
Lantz 2007:110; Esaiasson et al 2012:214f,224). The selection of relevant 
segments depends on the aim of the research and its theoretical interests (May 
2011:152f; Lantz 2007:107). Since the aim of the research is to understand 
reasons behind the different outcomes, I find it suitable to ask the question of 
―what are the most salient factors that can be extracted from the data that play a 
part in the causal chain that leads up the different outcomes?‖ The most salient 
factors I have extracted are listed (in their most reduced form) as variables in 
section 5.1, which is the table that describes the correlation between independent 
variables and outcomes. My aim is therefore to look for factors (not ―concepts, 
key words or categories‖ per se, and also the interrelation between them in causal 
chains. A reproduction of the empirical data (Chapter 4) is necessary before a 
theoretical analysis can start (Chapter 5).  
A challenge I found was that the literature on analyzing qualitative interview 
material cannot propose any particularly straight forward analytic tools. Instead, 
authors points to a ‗creative process‘ (Lantz 2007:108), a phase of ‗interplay 
between data and researcher‘ (Strauss and Corbin 1998:58) or the need of 
‗immersing oneself in the case, known as soaking and poking‘ (George and 
Bennett 2005:89). These diffuse phrases do not become clearer with the following 
quote: ―We believe that although a researcher can try to be as objective as 
possible, in a practical sense, this is not entirely possible‖ (Strauss and Corbin 
1998:58). This being said, I aim at a high degree of intersubjectivity (and some 
degree of objectivity) when I form dimensions that mirror the content of the 
interview material (Lantz 2007:111). 
How can I then go about? A problem is that almost every piece of information 
adds to the understanding, but in order to gain a clear, comparable and systematic 
understanding, one must extract the most salient components of the text data 
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without losing the meaning of it (Lantz 2007:110; Kvale and Brinkmann 
2009:219). Strauss and Corbin writes that the researcher can reduce (and abstract) 
the material into concepts and in turn relate them to each other. The reason for 
conceptualizing is to enable theoretical comparability (Strauss and Corbin 
1998:66,73,78; May 2011:153). The main unit for comparability in my study is 
the independent variables and the values that differentiate them from each other. 
Since I both need to look at correlations and the causal chains, I constantly 
have to bear in mind not to extract text segments in such a way that it would harm 
the understanding of the context (Lantz 2007:110). In turn, this is why I would 
argue that it is appropriate to for me to extract both the (1) variables and (2) how 
they interact with each other (causal chain). Lantz underscore the balancing act 
between the abstraction of comprehensible units from the interview material 
(variables) on the one hand and the complexity and nuances (causal chain) on the 
other (2007:110).  
Lantz explicitly recommends that the interview material should be broken 
down into text segments (quotations with the source explicitly stated) that can be 
labeled with a summarizing name (name of the independent variable). This is in 
accordance with reaching conceptual validity – the consistency between 
theoretical concepts and operational indicators (Esaiasson et al 2012:58f) – since a 
breaking down of the material into text segments leads to a meticulous 
examination. The aim is to deepen the understanding of the sub-units (variables) 
that together constitutes the whole (causal chain). In order to structure the material 
further, more questions must be asked towards it; first, what case is talked about?; 
what issues or aspects are talked about?; are different dimensions (variables) 
distinguishable? (Lantz 2007:110f; Esaiasson et al 2012:219,223). 
For a hands-on description of how I code quotes into (1) variables and (2), the 
causal chains, i.e. how the variables interact with each other, see Appendix C, 
subsection 10.2 ―Coding the Interview Material‖. Lantz explicitly recommend one 
to construct such a table and the main reason is to achieve intersubjectivity, to 
show the interpretational steps taken from raw text data to more abstract variables 
(see Lantz 2007:111-115,116). I will still present some particularly revealing 
quotations in my empirical chapter.  
Once the material is coded, one needs to look for patterns in how people talk 
about events and phenomena. The researcher moves from patterns (text 
segments), to analysis (coding text segments into variables), to synthesis (finding 
out how the variables interact) and finally to models (causal chain)
14
 (Lantz 
2007:119). Examples of patterns and the coding (analysis according to Lantz) are 
seen in section 10.1 and 10.2. The synthesis is, once the empirics are presented, 
basically a return to theory in order to see what this has to say about the empirics 
(the merging of the two, section 5.1). The model I propose is the causal chain 
(section 5.3) which will also be of discussion. (Lantz 2007:120f) I will then, 
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 My aim is not to develop theoretical models inductively, but yet to relate my analytic findings back to 
theoretical variables. From that platform, I will suggest how the variables can be understood as interacting to 
each other in a causal chain.  
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lastly, reach conclusions how one can understand the cases of peace and conflict 
within Nigeria. 
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4 Empirics: Mapping the Data 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the empirics needed to eventually present a 
comparable table that describes how the independent variables and the dependent 
variable correlate between my cases. 
Structural factors underlying to peace and conflict are often statistically 
measured on the aggregated country level, which describes the overall state of the 
country. I have been able to collect disaggregated statistics on the state and 
regional levels, which are used to describe how my cases perform on indicators 
underlying to peace and conflict. 
My disposition is defined by theoretical subsections under which I present the 
cases in the following order; 1) country level (if relevant), 2) North East: Boko 
Haram, 3) Niger Delta: MEND, and 4) South West: OPC. The reason for this 
disposition is to show the material in the most presentable and comparable form 
possible – that is to provide the context (country level) and then ask the same 
questions to all the within-cases – in accordance Tim May‘s suggestion of 
structure (2011:153). Qualitative material other than the interview material is used 
to triangulate empirics (May 2011:235). 
4.1 Violence within Nigeria – Dependent Variable 
ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset) has recorded violent events 
in developing states since 1997. It is, according to themselves, one of the most 
comprehensive datasets in its nature as it specifies the violence into several 
categories, for example type, date, by whom and the location of the violence.
15
 All 
this is specified within countries, which is why the dataset is suitable to use in a 
within-case comparison. One must bear in mind the difficulties in producing this 
type of dataset. There must inevitably have been unrecorded events given that the 
empirical accessibility in conflict zones is circumscribed. Attributing the violence 
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 ―ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset) is the most comprehensive public collection of 
political violence data for developing states. These data contain information on the specific dates and locations 
of political violence, the types of event, the groups involved, fatalities and changes in territorial control. 
Information is recorded on the battles, killings, riots, and recruitment activities of rebels, governments, militias, 
armed groups, protesters and civilians. Event data are derived from a variety of sources, mainly concentrating on 
reports from war zones, humanitarian agencies, and research publications.‖ (acleddata.com, retrieved 12 June, 
2013) 
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to the right group should also be problematic since the perpetrators do not 
necessarily reveal themselves and groups can also claim responsibility for 
violence done by others (Interview 9,14). 
Despite the problems of recording violent events, the ACLED-tool enables me 
to get a picture of the violence within Nigeria across time and space. Nigeria is the 
fourth most violent developing nation measured by the number of violent events 
(ACLED 2013), where 4139 violent events has been recorded from 1997 up to the 
end of 2012 with 15934 people killed (995 per year on average) The section 
below answers the questions of when the violent activity has taken place, the size 
of it, against whom it is directed, where it has taken place and how many 
casualties it resulted in. This gives a brief overview of the violence. 
 
North East 
 The first violent event that involved Boko Haram is recorded by ACLED 
on July 26, 2009 and the activity has grown since then.  
 In total, 570 violent events are recorded as involving Boko Haram. 472 of 
them have the organization as the initiating actor while 98 of them have it 
as the responding actor. 
 Of the 472 events initiated by Boko Haram were 270 directed against 
civilians, 114 against police forces and 65 against military forces.  
 Boko Haram‘s activities are clearly regionalized; 295 events are recorded 
in Borno, 78 in Yobe, 32 in Kaduna and 27 in Bauchi. 75 percent of Boko 
Haram‘s recorded violent activity is located to these four states, 52 percent 
to Borno state.  
 ACLED has recorded 1980 people killed between 2009 and 2012 in 
violent events where Boko Haram initiated the violence and 1005 where it 
responded. That makes 2985 deaths in total. (calculated from 
acleddata.com/data/africa/) 
 
Niger Delta 
 The first violent activity that involved MEND is on March 23, 2006 and 
the activity is still ongoing.  
 In total, 140 violent events are recorded by ACLED up to the end of 2012 
as involving MEND. 101 of them are initiated by MEND while it has been 
the responding actor in 39 events.  
 Of the 101 events initiated by MEND, 36 were directed against civilians 
(18 events against internationals and 18 against Nigerians), 30 were 
directed against the military forces of Nigeria and 29 events do not have 
any counterpart recorded (unknown). Of the 39 events where MEND was 
the responding actor, 24 are recorded as initiated by the military.  
 MEND‘s activities are also highly regionalized; 49 events are recorded in 
Delta, 41 in Rivers and 35 in Bayelsa states. 89 percent of MEND‘s 
recorded violent activity is located to these three Niger Delta states.  
 ACLED has recorded 211 people killed between 2006 and 2012 in violent 
events where MEND initiated the violence and 210 where it responded. 
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That makes 421 deaths in total. (calculated from 
acleddata.com/data/africa/). 
 
South West 
 The first violent activity that involved OPC (O‘odua People‘s Congress) is 
on March 1, 1999 and the organization was mainly active between 1999 
and 2006 with two exceptional cases occurring in 2012.  
 This makes up 40 in total and 35 violent events where OPC was the 
initiating actor. 5 events are recorded where OPC was the responding 
actor, 3 of them initiated by the police forces. 
 10 events were directed against themselves, labeled as ―mutiny of OPC‖, 9 
events towards the police forces and 8 events towards other ethnic militias 
(Ijaw-, Hausa- and Fulani ethnic militias).  
 OPC‘s activity is mainly regionalized to Lagos state, where 28 events, 70 
percent, took place.  
 ACLED has recorded 99 people killed between 1999 and 2012 in violent 
events where OPC initiated the violence and 17 people killed where it 
responded. That makes 116 deaths in total. (calculated from 
acleddata.com/data/africa/). 
 
The violence in sum: 
 
Actor  Boko Haram  MEND  OPC 
  
Violence 
 
When?   2009 -  2006 -   1999 – 2006 (2012) 
Number of violent events (total) 570  140  40 
...where the actor initiated the event 472  101  35 
...where the actor responded to the event 98  39  5 
Mainly against  Civilians,   Civilians,  Themselves (due to mutiny), 
Police forces,  Military forces  Police forces, 
Military forces    Ethnic militias 
Mainly where?  Borno,  Delta,  Lagos 
   Yobe,  Rivers, 
   Kaduna,  Bayelsa 
   Bauchi 
Number of fatalities (total) 2985  421  116 
4.2 Political Map of Nigeria 
I present the political map of Nigeria to show where my cases are located. There 
are 36 states in Nigeria (plus Abuja as the Federal Capital Territory, F.C.T.) 
located within six geopolitical zones. The zones and their states are the following: 
  
36 
 
 
Geopolitical zones States 
South East Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi, Imo and Abia. 
South South Edo, Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, Cross-River and Akwa-Ibom. 
South West Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ondo and Ekiti. 
North Central Kwara, Kogi, Plateau, Nassarawa, Benue, Niger and Abuja 
Federal Capital Territory 
North East Taraba, Adamawa, Borno, Yobe, Bauchi and Gombe. 
North West Sokoto, Zamfara, Kebbi, Kaduna, Katsina, Kano and 
Jigawa. 
 
My study is on the regional level and the states I have put in bold are those that 
best correspond with my three regional cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since I have described the violence (dependent variable) and showed where my 
cases are located, I move on to the presentation of the empirical material I use to 
describe the context of Nigeria and my three within-cases. 
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4.3 Governance 
4.3.1 Governance: Country Level 
Governance is a very problematic feature in Nigeria, highlighted by a number of 
sources as a systemic issue throughout Nigeria (Interview 12,13,14,19,20). Three 
sub-variables of governance often mentioned are lack of accountability, impunity 
and widespread corruption. Campbell (2011:10) notes that the post-colonial 
transition of Nigeria, despite becoming a federal state, was marred with elite 
power centralization and marginalization of disempowered groups. 
Lack of accountability. Political institutions in Nigeria often are driven by 
individuals with the aim of preserving their own political and economic interests 
rather than work for the population that voted for them (Interview 4,14). How 
power is distributed in Nigeria is hard to get a clear picture of since there are 
features that disturb the possibility of holding people in power accountable due to 
an overall culture of lack of accountability and an ―extraordinarily high level of 
impunity at all levels‖ (Interview 4). The few states that have better governance 
seem to be more of a coincidence than stemming from accountability (Interview 
4,13,14). 
 
Governance in Nigeria is [...] simply individual driven. You will find a wonderful 
governor in the North who will be carrying out needs-driven development for the 
people. You will find another one in the South West who is doing a good job; you 
can find another one in the South East or Niger Delta who is doing a good job. But 
the majority of them are not so inclined. So, that means that you can have isolated 
cases [of good governance]. (Interview 14, my emphasis) 
 
The lack of good governance can be explained by the relationship between the 
politicians and the population. Accountability does not seem to work due to lack 
of understanding and experience of how it works – people even seem to perceive 
the role of politicians as buying loyalty by handing out money (Interview 6). The 
relationship between the politicians and the population seems to be very 
asymmetrical: 
 
Politics is a bit of a closed system. When you are in, you are not going to be loyal to 
the people because they cannot punish you and they cannot reward you. You cannot 
base your mandate on the people. You have to satisfy those who got you in that 
position and those are not the people because the election has been rigged. So it‘s 
the people who gave you the candidacy in the party, who rigged for you, who 
supported you with money in your candidacy. Those are the people you have to 
serve first. (Interview 6) 
 
Nigerian governments have ―over the years showed it is not responsible for the 
welfare of its citizens‖ (Interview 20; see also Falola and Heaton 2008:Chapters 
7-9 for a historical background) and ―one can even challenge the fact that there is 
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actually a genuine and credible policy oriented towards the broader public‖ 
(Interview 4). The huge gap in the relationship between the political elite and the 
population is further cemented by the fact that merely 8 percent of Nigeria‘s GDP 
stem from taxes (estimated as of 2012) (CIA World Factbook). Politicians become 
independent of their voters and the vast natural wealth
16
 has not translated into 
improved living standards for the great majority, as corruption exact a heavy toll. 
(ICG 2006b:19) Nigerians were on average poorer in 2000 than in the start of the 
oil boom in the early 1970s (Meredith 2011:548). 
The fact that very few or no one is punished for corruption or for the rigged 
elections can exemplify the impunity. The last presidential election, in 2011, was 
considered as the best in Nigeria so far, but still the politicians...  
 
...clearly buy the votes. During the last election, for six weeks, out of a sudden and 
in a mysterious way, there were no 1000 Naira bills
17
 on the market. For six weeks, 
they were vanished. (Interview 2) 
 
Buying votes can even be done directly by giving cash at the polling station in 
exchange for the vote on a certain candidate (Interview 12), or indirectly through 
proxies such as religious leaders who promise the votes from their respective 
religious communities (Interview 1). In sum, as one informant formulated it: ―The 
election system is screwy enough that no one trusts it‖ (Interview 13).  
Another method to get and obtain power is through the use of thugs, 
something that can be done throughout the whole country and ―any governor can 
pick up the phone and call the militants‖ (Interview 2). Political meetings can 
easily be disturbed: 
 
...you can‘t rely on police protecting your rally. If you are an opposition party, you 
would have to have a muscle element or the ruling party will come with theirs and 
rampage your rally and prevent you from doing your stuff. It has always been there 
(Interview 6). 
 
Buying thugs is a widespread phenomenon in Nigeria and the consequence is the 
seasonal violence during election periods (Interview 1,6,12; ICG 2006b:21). The 
right to a free political campaigning and a free voting procedure are thus severely 
circumscribed. Moreover, with regards to disputes, the general inability of the 
judiciary limits the scope for resolving disagreements without recourse to 
violence, a systemic problem throughout Nigeria (Interview 13). 
Corruption, both at high and low levels, is widespread in Nigeria (Falola and 
Heaton 2008:240). Transparency International ranks Nigeria in the year 2011 as 
country number 143 out of 183 with the score of 2,4 out of 10 and 73 percent of 
the Nigerians consider corruption as becoming worse between 2009 and 2011. 
The police can serve as an example of widespread low level corruption (Falola 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
16
 Nigeria is Africa‘s oil producing state number one as of 2010 (the Richest 2013). 
17
 Equivalent to 6,2 USD or 40,7 SEK as of July 17, 2013. 
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and Heaton 2009:240). They often do not have the capacities to carry out their 
intended work, by not being trained properly and are to a large extent corrupted. 
(Interview 4)  
 
What do you expect from the police? You expect them to create safety but that is not 
what they are doing. They are doing quite the opposite; they are like armed robbers 
standing somewhere extorting money. That is robbery. (Interview 6) 
 
The elite also grab an un-proportionally large share of the nation‘s wealth with the 
use of corruption (see Lundgren & Kromann-Dragsted 2012; Campbell 2011:17). 
Nigeria‘s dependence on oil revenues has had major consequences since it has 
lead the country to becoming a ―rentier state‖ since the 1970s. The rentier state of 
Nigeria is dependent on the oil companies to pay rents through licenses and 
royalties. High level corruption has run rampant under that system due to the lack 
of accountability and ―citizens‘ opinion of the government becomes irrelevant, 
since the government does not maintain its power through popularity but through 
coercion and the control of resources‖. (Falola and Heaton 2008:184)  
In terms of a welfare state, there is not much to mention in the case of Nigeria: 
 
Everyone has first of all to rely on him or herself for basic needs; access to water, 
access to electricity, access to education. Public education is a disaster. [...] Each 
Nigerian is a head of government in their own capacity because they have to manage 
the mini-state which is the house and provide all the basic services for the 
household, water, electricity, employment, healthcare, all these things you would 
expect the state to have some degree of intervention or interference, especially in a 
poor country like this one. (Interview 4) 
4.3.2 Governance: Regional Level 
I tried to find out if there are regions or states in Nigeria that have better 
governance and if so, why. I could not get a picture that good or bad governance 
was varying across the regions
18
. Portraying governance at the regional level is 
therefore hard. 
 
North East 
Governance in the North East can be described by a long term neglect of the area 
(Interview 15). Examples can be seen in today‘s situation. Education and policing 
are features that are under heavy constraints (Interview 9,14). Industries have left 
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 Answering the question of if different regions or states have better governance than others would also require 
another research approach. Such study would look at the gubernatorial state level, which unfortunately is very 
hard currently given the travel restrictions due to the bad security situation within the country and also since 
governance in Nigeria seems to be a closed system without proper and transparent insight into the decision 
making.   
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the larger North in recent years, creating a once flourishing area into an 
economically declining one (Interview 8). 
 
Niger Delta 
Likewise, the notable issues in the Delta region are ―lack of political 
commitment‖ (Interview 15) and bad governance (Interview 20), highlighted by 
Ms. Abiodun Baiyewu, Country Director at the NGO Global Rights when asked 
about the reasons behind the low level of development in the region: 
 
I think it is obvious; it‘s corruption, lack of transparency in governance resulting in 
non-governance. Lack of accountability to the people, also because the people do 
not understand, because of the years of military rule, the people really did not know 
how to hold government accountable. That itself is also problematic. Where you 
cannot hold government accountable for governance, government does what it wants 
to do, how it wants to do it, when it wants to do it – and so no schools, no roads, and 
of course wherever the extractive activities, cost of living sky-rockets and the local 
people cannot afford to live in their own communities anymore, apart from the 
environmental degradation. (Interview 19) 
 
One could without objection say that the Niger Delta region should be a high 
developed area since this is where the oil comes from and also given the amount 
of funds pumped back to the oil producing states. The oil producing states get a 
higher share in a derivation form
19
 on how to distribute the oil wealth from the 
federal to the state level, but corrupt politicians have failed to utilize the money 
for development. (Interview 12,20)  A source points out two major hindrances for 
this; one being that the government does not allow the people to benefit from the 
oil resources and the second being corruption that the Nigerians ―have a 
government that cannot punish corrupt people so the oil companies operate 
without regard to the rights of the local people.‖ (Interview 20; also 19)  
 
South West  
The relatively peacefulness in the South West is not necessarily due to better 
governance, since the relationship could go both ways. The interview material on 
the country level above show that bad governance, impunity, corruption and lack 
of accountability are factors present throughout Nigeria.  
Babatunde Fashola, the governor of Lagos state, is internationally considered 
as a good governor (Interview 12). One can of course question if the relative 
peace in Lagos state should be attributed to governance. Other factors should 
logically partake in the explanation since this region scores relatively well on 
several indicators. Lagos is for example the major urban and economic center in 
Nigeria and in West Africa.  
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 A derivation form grants budgetary allocation from the federal level to the 36 states. The oil producing states 
gets a higher compensation. For the exact ―Monthly Shares of Distribution From The Federation Account By 
State‖ (as of December 2011) see WB NER 2013:27. 
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4.4 Development Indicators 
4.4.1 Development Indicators – Country Level 
Nigeria scores very low on the Gini Index
20
. Nigeria is ranked country number 49 
out of 136 (country number 1 being the most unequal) as of the year 2010 and 
scores 48,83 (0 being the most equal and 100 the most unequal distribution) (CIA 
World Factbook). Also, given that the Nigerian population grows with four 
million people yearly, the increased national wealth has a low impact on the GDP 
per capita growth. GDP per capita was in 2012 only 1555 USD (World Bank 
Statistics) and the economic growth in recent years has mostly ―padded the 
pockets of those who are already financially secure‖ (Falola and Heaton 
2009:237). 68% of the population lives below 1,25 USD (PPP) per day (UNDP 
2012). Nigeria is in the year 2012 ranked country number 153 out of 186 in the 
Human Development Index
21
 and has not shown any significant progress between 
2005 and 2012.
22
 Nigeria‘s HDI was 0,471 in the year 2012, which is slightly 
below the regional sub-Saharan average of 0,475 (zero being the lowest and 1 
being the highest score) (UNDP 2012). 
Life expectancy in Nigeria is at 52 years and only 1.9 per cent of the nation‘s 
budget is expended on health. A clear North-South health divide, among other 
divides, can be noted in Appendix D. Adult illiteracy rate for adult (both sexes) is 
61.3 per cent. These figures are in stark contrast with the growth in the Nigerian 
economy. 
Major causes of Nigeria‘s poverty include high level of inequality attributable 
to unequal access to income opportunities and basic infrastructure, and poor 
education and health. (Omonona 2010:3) Poverty in Nigeria is as of 2013/2014 at 
64,2 percent on the aggregated level, which is worse than 2009/2010 when the 
number was 62,5 percent  At the same time, Nigeria‘s GDP has grown 7 percent 
annually in the past seven years. (WB NER
23
 2013:9) A clear consequence is the 
grave inequality in economic distribution, noted in the low performance on the 
Gini Index. Official unemployment statistics on the national level has gone from 
13,1 in 2000 to 21,1 in 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics 2010). The level of 
literacy indicates the educational level - Nigeria scores 46 percent on average 
among children aged 5-16 (DHS EdData Survey 2010:161). 
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 Gini Index measures ―the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among 
individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution‖ (definition by the 
World Bank). 
21
 HDI provides a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education and 
income. 
22
 Nigeria scored 0,434 in the year 2005 and 0,471 in the year 2012. Longitudinal comparisons should be made 
carefully due to methodological changes over time. 
23
 World Bank Nigeria Economic Report 2013. 
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4.4.2 Development Indicators – Regional Level 
If the economic distribution is split into the disaggregated state level, it looks like 
the following graph. The North-South poverty divide is clearly seen if the graph is 
cross-references with the political map of Nigeria. 
 
 
The North East has the highest poverty rate
24
 at 59,7 percent on average, the 
South South (where the Delta region is located) scores 37,6 percent and the South 
West, the region with the lowest poverty rate, scores at 30,6. (WB NER 2013:9) 
The below table (Omonona 2010:2-3) shows disaggregated statistics on 
poverty between the geopolitical zones from the years 1996 and 2004. It is 
important to look at statistics from a few years back, since indicators back then 
could explain the situation of today. The North-South divide is again clearly 
visible: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
24
 With adult equivalent correction. It ―measure the welfare of an adult equivalent, supposing that welfare is 
equally distributed in the household. For instance, if an household with two adults has an equivalence scale of 1 
and an household with two adults and one child has an equivalence scale of 1.2, this means that the second 
household need 1.2 times more income than the ﬁrst household in order to get the same level of welfare. Or that 
the cost of the ﬁrst child is 20%‖. See http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/PP/lubrano/cours/Lecture-8.pdf 
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Incidence of poverty by geopolitical zones
25
 
 
Note that the poverty in the North is at the same levels in 2004 as in 1996, which 
is not the case with the South where the situation has improved significantly.  
I will now briefly present the development indicators of poverty, 
education/illiteracy and unemployment for each case respectively. 
 
North East 
The North East is the region worst hit by poverty, 59,7 percent according to the 
latest statistics from the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics. Poverty and the 
implications of it are stressed by a number of sources and the further up north you 
go, the more the poverty level increases (Interview 1,13). A clear indicator of the 
level of education is the illiteracy rate. Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS) cover educational data in all 36 states.  
Borno, Yobe and Bauchi are among the worst performers on literacy among 
children aged 5-16. 15, 11 and 8 percent respectively of this group are able to read 
in these states. Kaduna scores at 46 percent. (DHS EdData Survey 2010:161) This 
makes 20 on average among these states. A dangerous feature is that the lack of 
education has over the years increased the level of radicalization: 
 
You can see a sharp divide between the haves and the have nots and it speaks to 
even the proportion of people that are literate or educated vis-à-vis those that are not 
literate and not educated. You see a lot of people that are out of school in much of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
25
 The incidence of poverty (headcount index) is the share of the population whose income or consumption is 
below the poverty line; that is, the share of the population that cannot afford to buy a basic basket of goods. 
(IFPRI 2010) 
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the North and this has been like that for many years so the situation in the North 
right now, with the insecurity and radicalism, is just like playing out what would 
have been predicted many years ago. (Interview 14) 
 
The unemployment in the North East is as of the year 2010 at 30,2 percent. States 
accounted for are Borno, Yobe, Kaduna and Bauchi. (calculated from the National 
Bureau of Statistics). Related to this, an informant referred to a forthcoming study 
on social capital in West Africa that investigates where young people go for help 
if they do not have a job or an income. Young people in northern Nigeria had by 
far fewer answers to that question as compared to young southerners who had a 
denser network of social contacts. (Interview 13)   
 
Niger Delta 
Poverty rate in the three Delta states of interest is around 34 percent on average 
(calculated from the National Bureau of Statistics).  
The states in the Niger Delta region scores relatively well on literacy among 
children aged 5-16. Delta scores at 65, Rivers at 68 and Bayelsa at 75 percent – 
which gives a score on 69,3 on average. (DHS EdData Survey 2010:161).  
Unemployment in the Niger Delta is at 22,8 percent as of the year 2010. 
(Calculated from the National Bureau of Statistics) 
 
South West 
As stated above, the South West is the region that scores best on poverty rate, on 
30,6 percent.  
South West is also the region that performs best on literacy rates among 
children 5-16. The region scores at 78 percent on average, ranging from 61 
percent in Ogun and 92 percent in Lagos state. (DHS EdData Survey 2010:161) 
Education in the South West is highlighted by a number of sources as taking part 
in the explanation for the relative peacefulness.  
Unemployment in the South West (Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo 
states) is comparatively low, at 11,9 percent (calculated from National Bureau of 
Statistics). 
4.5 Unifying Forces 
4.5.1 Unifying Forces – Country Level 
Given that harsh situation in terms of governance and development, interviewees 
often come to the point that different groups feel the need of protecting their 
regional interest in their own capacity and that ―everyone in Nigeria wants a share 
of the cake‖ (Interview 4). This is also consistent with a historical analysis. Sub-
national identities being stronger than the national Nigerian identity goes back to 
at least the 1960 (Falola and Heaton 2008:159), and seems to be still present. 
Rebel groups whose causes are to protect regional interests still tend to emerge in 
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Nigeria and there is still a fear of becoming ―dominated‖ by other groups in the 
country (Interview 18, Falola and Heaton 2008:159). Many different ethnic and/or 
regional militias came about between the 1970s and the 1990s (Meredith 
2011:544) and such militias can still be seen in the contemporary dataset produced 
by ACLED (acleddata.com/data/Africa/Nigeria). Esther Ozuma, a Nigerian 
lawyer, formulates this phenomenon effectively: 
 
You see some ethnic groups rising to propagate strong ethnic sentiments above 
national interest and also giving rights to the general feeling that ―I have to protect 
my region‖, so in the North East you find the Boko Haram, the dominant group you 
find in the South West is OPC, in the South South [Niger Delta] is the MEND 
(Interview 18). 
 
Since many sources stated that regional political and economic interests are 
protected and fought for, I asked if these groups; Boko Haram, MEND and the 
OPC were of the same ―category‖ in terms of the reasons of their fight and their 
aim with it. The answers points to the conclusion that they thrive on different 
unifying forces. 
An informant summarizes what the ―organizing narratives‖ between the 
regions are centered around: In the North, it centers around 1) religion and 2) a 
sense of political exclusion, in the Delta, 1) exploitation by oil companies, 2) 
environmental degradation and 3) a sense of political exclusion, but when it 
comes to the South West there are not many organizing narratives. This region is 
economically dominant, Lagos is a melting pot of ethnicities and there is no clear 
religious divide amongst the Yorubas. (Interview 13, also Interview 
4,9,11,12,14,15,18,19) 
4.5.2 Unifying Forces – Regional Level 
North East 
A main ―unifying force‖ – to use Gurr‘s own words (2007:138) – of Boko Haram 
is religious identity and a rejection of politicians, the police and Islamic 
authorities that they perceive praise western/secular attributes (Interview 
1,2,12,19; Walker 2012:2) and ―their history as an ideological [religious] 
movement is much longer than their history as an armed movement‖ (Interview 
13). Western education is particularly criticized as part of a long-standing mistrust 
towards colonial and Christian influence from the south (ICG 2010:37). A strict 
Shari‘a law was instituted in many northern states when democracy was 
introduced in 1999 – something that lead to an increased tension between 
Christians and Muslims in the region (Falola and Heaton 2009:239). 
 
In wanting to preserve identity, the largely Islamic North resisted Western education 
in the early 30s, 40s – and ‗til today has not manage to catch up with the South, 
largely with the South West, which is also part of what you find to be one of the 
solutions of why the South West is also relatively peaceful. (Interview 19). 
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This is largely played out as a rejection of Nigerian secularism (Interview 15) and 
Nigerian state institutions. Still, their anger is primarily directed against people in 
government in Nigeria who live by western ideas and originally against corrupt 
Muslim leaders (Interview 9,12,13). These are still their main target and attacks 
on bars, churches and schools in recent years are in addition to that. The sense of 
political exclusion stems from corrupt politician who steals the wealth of the 
country at the expense of development in the North (Interview 13). 
There is also an, although subordinate, ethnic dimension – Boko Haram was 
in its early stages primarily made up of people form the Kanuri tribe in the far 
North East and ―all their leaders are Kanuri‖ (Interview 13).  
 
Niger Delta 
The main unifying force behind MEND is environmental rights and economic 
compensation for the pollution and destruction of the environment the oil and gas 
production causes (Interview 4,20). The fight is both anti-government and anti-
oil-company (Falola and Heaton 2009:239). Government neglect towards the area 
results in poor public services (Meredith 2011:543) and corruption disrupts the 
intended flow of oil revenues back to this area (Interview 10,12,20). The result 
becomes a widespread mistrust towards the state and the political elite.  
The ethnic dimension in this conflict is subordinate to the fight for rights and 
compensation. Several ethnicities in the delta area partake in the fight, the most 
notable being the Ijaws and the Ogoni (Meredith 2011:545, Peel 2010:7) and 
almost all people living in the Delta are Christians (Interview 13).  
 
South West 
The South West does not have extractive oil or gas industries and does not seem 
to have the same problems with religious identity (Interview 6) as compared to 
other regions: 
 
The South West is a region where most of the residents are educated and they are 
not strict on religious issues. In the South West you find a conglomerate of people 
with various religious persuasions. [...] They have a relaxed approach to issues. You 
don‘t see fanatics from the South West, not at all. There are no extremists in the 
South West. You find people that are very enlightened and brace the Western form 
of education for generations. The defining thing about the South West is that they 
have a history of encounter in westernization. It has brought to bear in all facets of 
their living; their religion, their culture, their hospitality. Lagos is the most populated 
city, it welcomes everybody without discrimination. (Interview 18) 
 
The fact that South West is different in its religious composition compared to 
other regions is underscored by Falola and Heaton. The Yorubas, the major 
ethnicity in the South West, are more or less evenly split between Christians and 
Muslims (2008:223). This region has therefore also a higher level of interreligious 
marriage compared with other regions (Interview 11). 
  
47 
 
OPC ―is an intellectual group with militant capacities, but they are silent 
presently‖ (Interview 18). The main unifying force behind OPC seems to be 
political. It was an ―armed political vigilante group‖ that later ―metamorphosed 
into a kind of morale group that was protecting the rights of [southwestern] 
citizens‖ (Interview 1,11).  
There are no unifying forces in the South West of the same magnitude as in 
other parts of the country. Opportunities are better in the South West, which 
Lagos – the economic capital of West Africa – accounts for to a large extent. It is 
the largest and fastest growing city in Sub-Sahara and Lagosians themselves are 
the minority today. The result, according to Abiodun Baiyewu is a... 
 
...mix of different cultures, different religions, high level of education, expatriates, 
high-level of commerce which means better job opportunities exist in Lagos which 
is also the pull to Lagos from the whole of Nigeria and most of West Africa. 
Possibly, better health care, better infrastructure. [...] Because the dynamic of Lagos 
itself and the influence of Lagos on the entire South West, you will find that the 
South West would be largely peaceful because if there was high level of poverty in 
any of the southwestern states, it is easy for the young people to leave their state and 
go onto Lagos and try to make a living and so you don‘t find restive youths 
frustrated and having nothing to do and nowhere to go creating a lot of problem. 
(Interview 19) 
4.6 International Rebel Assistance – Regional Level 
North East 
Boko Haram thrive upon international links, for example to AQIM (al-Qaida in 
the Islamic Maghreb) (Interview 4,9,13). The question is to know the size and 
importance of it. What is clear is that the group has become more sophisticated – 
they went from using motorcycles and guns to use IEDs (Improvised Explosive 
Devise) and suicide bombings. The techniques and knowledge behind such bombs 
had to come from somewhere else, and the new type of modus operandi is also 
used in other countries (Interview 4; Walker 2012:2). The attacks on the UN 
headquarters (August 26, 2011) and the police headquarters (June 16, 2011) in 
Abuja would require preparations and outside support. (Interview 4) The latter 
attack is believed to be the first suicidal car bombing in the history of Nigeria 
(Brock 2011).  
The border to neighboring countries in the North is a very porous desert area, 
making it very difficult to control (Interview 2,4,12,13), which enables Boko 
Haram to draw upon affiliates in countries such as Mali, Chad, Niger and 
Cameroon (Interview 9). 
 
Niger Delta 
It could also be the case that the Niger Delta borders, on the Bay of Guinea, 
should be understood as very porous. It is hard for the police and the military to 
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intervene in the vast areas of swamps and creeks, which gives the MEND an 
advantageous position (ICG 2006b:i). MEND‘s weaponry can possibly be traced 
to international arms smuggling taking place at sea or in the creeks (Interview 2).   
 
South West 
Since the military capacity of the OPC seems have declined and given that the 
OPC could be seen as a political vigilante group (Interview 1), there should not be 
much concrete international support to this group, or, at least none of the 
informants spoke of such support. 
4.7 Violence and Crime – Dependent Variable 
Revisited 
North East 
It is possible that Boko Haram could have been sponsored financially by people in 
power
26
 (Interview 12,13,19), but that the situation has now gotten out of hand. 
The logic would have been to finance insurgency in order to destabilize the region 
and to delegitimize Jonathan and show his incapacities. Boko Haram is now 
thought to be economically self-sufficient (Interview 9,13), mainly due to 
successful bank robberies and kidnappings of many Nigerians for ransom 
(Interview 9,13). 
It is hard to understand what Boko Haram really wants by looking at their 
targets. One aim is the implementation of Shari‘a law (Interview 12; Walker 
2012:3) and to attack what they perceive as state targets such as security forces, 
public schools, churches and bars. (Interview 13)  
There has been a remarkable shift in the modus operandi of Boko Haram. 
After the police killed their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, they ―took up arms against 
‗perceived oppressors‘, i.e. [...] the security forces‖ (Interview 15). The group has 
recently undertaken more grave types of violence and has radically propagated for 
war on secular authorities. They are now targeting school teachers, health care 
staff, women and children. A high level of radicalism is stated as a requirement 
before undertaking such attacks. (Interview 1,4,9,15; also ICG 2010:37) ―When 
you go into a school and you slit the throat of students [...] you really have to 
reach a certain degree of radicalism to go that far‖ (Interview 4).  
 
Niger Delta 
The main intention of MEND is to get compensation for the destruction of 
livelihoods and a political retribution for the human rights violations. Poverty, 
lack of development and lack of reasonable alternatives are integral features in 
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 There is a lack of evidence behind this claim due to the shadowy structure at the different political levels.  
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cementing the dynamic and youths are especially employable by the insurgents 
(ICG 2006b:21).  
The harsh situation has created a large scale black oil market and oil theft is 
huge in the area. The oil sector shrank by 4,7 percent and the exports declined by 
20 percent  in 2006 due to unrest in the Delta region (Falola and Heaton 2009:236, 
239). Theft of crude oil accounts for at least 150 000 barrels a day or seven 
percent of Nigeria‘s daily production (World Oil 2012-02-28). Nigeria‘s loss of 
oil production reached a record high of one-third in June 2008. (Falola and 
Genova 2009:xxviii) Oil theft is mainly done by bunkering of oil (cracking and 
tapping oil from pipelines) and oil piracy on cargos in the Gulf of Guinea. A third 
dimension is that you can buy cheap subsidized fuel in Nigeria and sell it at the 
higher market price in neighboring countries
27
 (Interview 4). The involvement of 
authorities in the black oil market is seen as a given fact, because of the massive 
quantities being stolen and that it needs to be refined and traded (Interview 
2,4,12).  
Another big source of income is kidnapping of expatriated foreign oil workers 
for ransom. 
 
This is a thing that few people would admit in the international community, but there 
are more than 100 prisoners right now, expats [expatriates], in the Delta. [...] It is a 
huge business, kidnapping. (Interview 2) 
 
South West 
According to ACLED, there are still some instances of political protests or riots, 
kidnappings and even violent events in the South West, but not as near compared 
with other regions (acleddata.com/data/africa/; Interview 8). The crime rate in the 
South West is still high (Interview 8), but there are no organized insurgency 
today. 
4.8 The Reactions of the State 
The unrest in the two cases of conflict has been met with different approaches.  
 
North East 
Boko Haram rejected an amnesty offer after Jonathan set up a committee to look 
into the possibilities of granting the Boko Haram amnesty. Only weeks after the 
rejection, the Nigerian state sent more police and military forces against Boko 
Haram in May 2013, and reports are saying that killing is done on an 
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 ―It is said that when the government lifted the subsidy here, it increased the prices of fuel in the neighboring 
countries or in some parts of them at least, because they were benefiting from the whole system as well.‖ 
(Interview 4). 
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indiscriminate basis, with no intention of minimizing damage and killings
28
 
(Interview 6,9).  
 
[W]hat we are facing is not just militancy or criminality, but a rebellion and 
insurgency by terrorist groups which pose a very serious threat to national unity and 
territorial integrity. Already, some northern parts of Borno state have been taken 
over by groups whose allegiance is to different flags and ideologies. [...] Following 
recent developments in the affected states, it has become necessary for Government 
to take extraordinary measures to restore normalcy. [...] I hereby declare a State of 
Emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states.  
Accordingly, the Chief of Defence Staff has been directed to immediately deploy 
more troops to these states [...] (Goodluck Jonathan, President of Nigeria, speech on 
May 14, 2013) 
Four days later, Boko Haram declared war on youths who they claim aid the 
security forces. The reaction of Boko Haram has not fully been seen yet but the 
indiscriminate violence of the state fuels the mistrust towards the government 
(Interview 4,8,13).  
 
Niger Delta 
The state has since 2009 being implementing an amnesty program (originally 
negotiated by former president Yar‘adua) towards the MEND insurgents. The idea 
is that the insurgents are paid monthly (and are also offered education abroad and 
job training) in exchange for laying down weapons. The program can neither be 
assessed as a complete success nor as a complete failure. Nothing has been done 
to tackle the underlying causes of conflict since there are still vast polluted areas 
left uncleaned (Interview 8). Although, the number of violent attacks decreased 
after the amnesty was put in place. The logic of granting payments in exchange 
for not doing violent attacks can of course be criticized. It has created a situation 
where some people want to be labeled as insurgents since this could give them a 
share of the amnesty funds. There is also a problem with the distribution of the 
amnesty money – it is not trickling down to the middlemen or the local foot 
soldiers as intended, meanwhile the top leaders of MEND enjoy a good life in 
villas in Abuja and Lagos, which creates a lot of frustration. Also, there is no exit 
strategy – no one knows what will happen when the amnesty program runs out in 
2015 (Interview 4,12).  It is believed that MEND easily can resume the violence if 
the amnesty money stops (Interview 4,12). The amnesty program is hence 
working partly, temporarily and with unclear consequences when it stops.  
 
South West 
 
There is no open conflict. It does not seem that there is an ideological issue around 
the [South] West. There is no environmental issue and a big scramble for access to 
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 Refers to the attack of the security forces on the town of Baga, Borno state, where allegedly 185 people were 
killed in clashes between the security forces and Boko Haram members on the 16 and 17 of April 2013. 
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resources. Of course, there is major corruption like anywhere else, there is major 
poverty like anywhere else... (Interview 8) 
The OPC did have a considerable influence as a political pressure group that 
politicians needed to get support from. Still, there is no open conflict in the South 
West today.  
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5 Analysis 
5.1 Merging Theory and Empirics 
As stated earlier, it is crucial to merge theory and empirics. How can the empirical 
findings be understood with the help of theory?  
 
Country Level 
Mansfield and Snyder‘s findings are applicable on Nigeria. Given Nigeria‘s 
violent history after independence it is clear that the transitional phase – with 
weak political institutions together with a heterogeneous identities and economic 
inequalities between them – could not mitigate the problems in the country. 
Governance has been manipulated with the help of lack of accountability, 
impunity and widespread corruption, and created a widespread mistrust towards 
the politicians, which is consistent with Mansfield and Snyder and Taydas et. al. 
Coupled with the fact that at least 80 percent of the oil revenue is pumped into the 
federal revenues (not the state budget), this has created a huge gap between the 
elite and the population where politicians do not need to be held accountable to 
the population. This high level of economic and political asymmetry creates a 
durable opportunity to take action against it, in accordance with Gurr.  
Drawing on Murshed and Tadjoeddin, Nigeria seems to be a case of mostly 
vertical inequality, between the elite and the general population as seen in the Gini 
index. Still, inequalities can clearly be seen on the horizontal axis, mostly between 
the North and the South. This could partake as a perceived injustice, and possibly 
help as a unifying force to Boko Haram since the Christian South is comparatively 
better off.  
 
North East 
The North East has poor developmental circumstances, with high level of poverty, 
low level of education, high level of unemployment and a harsh desert 
environment. The fact that this situation is relatively the worst in many variables 
creates a problematic setting to begin with. Unjustness by the secular state and 
corrupt Muslim leaders is alluded to and the western form of education is rejected. 
The possibility to attract members of a cause is done with the help of religious 
saliency (Gurr refers to ethnocultural saliency).  
The North-South poverty divide, coupled with a religious fault line creates a 
clear conflict dynamic in accordance with Gurr‘s findings of how insurgencies 
emerge from communal groups. The government long-term developmental 
neglect of the North, from where industries have left at a large scale, can be seen 
as an incentive for insurgent action according to Gurr.  
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The state response to send in more security forces to attack Boko Haram 
members has resulted in an increase of deaths and reports show that attacks are 
done indiscriminately. The mistrust towards the government grows out of this. 
This can from the Boko Haram‘s perspective be understood as government 
repression against their cause, something that Gurr highlights as an incentive to 
take action and retaliate. A cycle of retaliation can be noted as security forces and 
Boko Haram have long battled each other. 
Capacities for collective action are according to Gurr helped by a geographic 
concentration, something that can be seen in the case of Boko Haram since it is 
mainly concentrated in the North East of the country. A preexisting organization 
in terms of identity cohesion helps to build a rebel organization. Three examples 
presented by Gurr exist in the case of Boko Haram, namely common religion, a 
shared economic situation and common political situation – which creates a fertile 
ground for building capacities and supporters. Religion is more useful to allude to 
than ethnicity since religion cross-cuts a large number of tribes, why a broader 
member base can be built. A network that stretches beyond porous national 
borders helps building capacities – but of what magnitude remains unknown. 
The importance of leadership that Gurr refers to seems to have played a part. 
The main initiating event of Boko Haram involved the death of their leader, 
Mohammed Yusuf, in police custody which sparked widespread riots and protests 
against the security forces. This can also be seen as a sudden opportunity to 
retaliate against security forces. 
 
Niger Delta  
This case scores at medium levels on the development indicators of poverty, 
education and employment. The oil revenue is distributed from federal level to the 
36 states but it has, at least not for the Niger Delta, translated into development or 
cleaning of the polluted and destroyed lands and waters. Widespread corruption 
hinders the funds to be properly invested. This can be understood as the long-term 
neglect that increases the likelihood of an armed insurgency to emerge. The 
opportunities to gain a share of the wealth that the communities are denied are 
obvious, in accordance with Gurr‘s theory, and the result is an emergence of an 
armed organization that earns a living out of the situation, from oil theft and 
kidnapping of expatriate oil workers. 
There may not be any salient ethnocultural or religious identity in the sense 
that Gurr proposes, but communities in the Niger Delta share the same overall 
situation which can be understood as a unifying force, still in accordance with 
Gurr. The income gap that the oil wealth creates between the elite and the local 
communities and the denial of their right to control the wealth under their land is 
as a discriminating policy and creates a disadvantageous position that cements the 
common identity. This creates a relative group position of past, present and 
probably future losses – a disadvantageous position and an incentive to rebel – 
consistent with Gurr‘s findings.  
Alluding to political and economic injustice is therefore useful for MEND to 
gain members and thus capacities for action. A shared political and economic 
situation creates a type of preexisting organization that Gurr refers to that goes 
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beyond ethnicities and communities that has a more limited reach. MEND is also 
geographically concentrated, in areas that are hard to intervene in, which leads to 
increased capacities for the rebel organization.   
The amnesty deal between the government of Nigeria and the MEND has 
reduced the violence, but only partly and with unclear consequences when it 
stops. This could although be an indicator that policy intervention – handing out 
money in this case – can reduce the willingness to resort to violence. 
 
South West 
This region is characterized with relatively better development in terms of low 
poverty, high education and low unemployment. Still, perceived political 
unfairness created a breeding ground for the OPC. The exact reasons why this 
organization has declined or became a peaceful group has not been the main focus 
of this study and would need a more thorough investigation to reach fair 
conclusions. Gurr‘s theory is although useful to understand the peaceful situation 
of the South West.  
To begin with, there should not be the same sense of disadvantage in this 
region given the better economic situation and lower unemployment rates. Gurr 
writes that a geographic concentration helps a rebel group in its existence and if 
the group is within an urban area, this decreases the likelihood rebellion. Lagos, 
with close to 18 million inhabitants, could therefore contain two important factors 
that absorb youth restiveness. First, as Baiyewu points out, Lagos is attractive for 
youths that want to make a living, and second, that urban environment lowers the 
risk of rebel organizations to emerge.  
There is no saliency of ethnocultural or religious identity in the South West. 
The Yoruba is split between Christians and Muslims. The mixture of identities in 
this region lessens the capacity of rebel groups to emerge since there would be no 
identity cohesion, according to Gurr‘s theory.  
5.2 Correlations 
The below table summarizes the empirical chapter and describes the correlation 
between the variables. The country level provides with the general context 
(constant variables) in which the independent variables vary. Since my 
investigation is a within-case analysis, it is important to do this kind of 
differentiation. This enables one to draw meaningful conclusions from the within-
cases. An initial step is to show the variance:  
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The above table describes the correlation between the variables. 
 
Constant variables: 
CV 1 – Bad governance 
CV 2 – Weak accountability 
CV 3 – Impunity 
CV 4 – Corruption 
CV 5 – Economic inequality 
 
Independent variables: 
IV 1 – Poverty 
IV 2 – Non-education 
IV 3 – Unemployment 
IV 4 – Salience of youth unemployment 
 
Intervening variables: 
IV 5 – Salience of religious identity 
IV 6 – Salience of environmental degradation 
 
Dependent variable 
DV – Conflict  
5.3 Causal Chain 
The below causal chain describes how variables could interact with each other. 
The observant reader notes that it is a translation of the variable table. I 
deliberately present it simplistically in order to discuss it below. It is important to 
bear in mind that I cannot propose an exact causal path since it is not possible to 
isolate one explaining variable. The below causal chain could although contain 
significant explanatory power.  
 
 
 
Variables CV 1 CV 2 CV 3  CV 4  CV 5 IV 1 IV 2 IV 3 IV 4 IV 5 IV 6 DV (conflict) 
Cases 
            
North East High High High High High High High High High High Medium Yes, High 
Niger Delta High High High High High Medium Medium Medium High Low High Yes, Medium 
South West High High High High High Medium Low Low Low Low Low No, Low 
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The scheme describes the causal chains where the three cases are put within the 
larger country level context. 
5.3.1 Discussing the Causal Chain 
All constant variables perform badly, but the case of South West clearly shows 
that they are not sufficient to result in an organized insurgency. Independent and 
intervening variables are therefore necessary to explain the different outcomes.  
The causal chain above needs contestation. First, the causal directions can be 
of discussion. There should be a considerable feed-back link from the dependent 
variable to the independent variables (and possibly the ―level of saliency of 
religious identity‖ in the case of North East) since it would be logical that a 
conflict impacts on levels of poverty, education, employment etc. why the conflict 
dynamics in turn could become further cemented. The causal relationship could 
partly work in the opposite direction, but if theory is consulted, one could say that 
such causal feedback should be understood as subordinate.  
Boko Haram is responsible for most killings, MEND the second most and 
OPC the least. Two independent variables show a strong correlation with this 
outcome, namely levels of education and unemployment. These two could be seen 
as indicators of inequality and if coinciding with identity lines, they could in fact 
contain a significant degree of explanatory power, and as they also coincide with 
salience of religious identity in the case of the North East and salience of 
environmental degradation in the case of the Niger Delta, the outcome becomes 
conflict, in accordance with by Gurr. The salience of religious identity has no 
strong correlation since both low and high levels of it correlate with the outcome 
of conflict. A look at theory again would say that the probability of conflict 
heightens when identity lines coincide with inequality. All cases have a high level 
of economic inequality, but it is only the North East that has a high level on the 
saliency of religious identity. The fault lines coincide in this case. Still, the 
unjustness seen in the Niger Delta could be understood as the unifying force of 
that region, suggesting a strong common identity among marginalized groups. A 
low level of education, combined with inequalities that coincide with identity 
lines, could increase the proneness of radicalization, as a qualitative reading of the 
North East could suggest. 
Poverty does not correlate particularly well since the Niger Delta and the 
South West performs at the same level but have different outcomes. Still, the 
South West performs slightly better on poverty than the Niger Delta in absolute 
terms, which could propose a strong correlation between the level of poverty and 
the level of conflict.  
International rebel assistance could unfortunately not be measured properly; 
this is in fact an extremely shadowy area and few others than the leaders of the 
insurgent organizations should know the level of it. Still, this variable can contain 
some degree of explanatory power. Several informants state that Boko Haram 
have international links (especially with AQIM). MEND‘s assistance could 
possibly by linked to the illegal trade of oil and weaponry. It would be reasonable 
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to say that OPC has no international rebel assistance of significance. It could 
therefore be the case that it co-varies with the difference in outcome. 
South West has low levels on the intervening variables and my findings 
suggest that the probability of conflict lowers if one of these has a low level. How 
to distribute explanatory power among the variables is although hard since the 
South West also has low values on the independent variables. 
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6 Conclusions 
The conclusions I have reached are contingent on my methodological and 
theoretical considerations and also on my empirical interview material. 
Several bad performing variables defines the context of the country, namely 
high level of bad governance, lack of accountability, high level of corruption, 
widespread impunity and high level of income inequality. The economic and 
political divide between the political elite and the population results in a situation 
where people must rely on themselves to provide for their living and wellbeing. 
This is coupled with regional groups fearing that they can be politically dominated 
by one another. These two dynamics translates into a climate that is prone to 
conflict. Still, the constant variables are not sufficient to result in an organized 
insurgency as more independent variables have to be added to the explanation of 
the outcome of conflict.  
It is possible to note several interesting regional differences within this overall 
setting. The three cases differ in several factors and multi-causality does not help 
to define the exact causes behind the phenomena. Instead, factors can be 
understood as partaking in a larger and more complex set of explanation, where 
education and unemployment show particularly strong correlations. Poverty also 
shows (in absolute terms) a strong correlation with the difference in outcome. 
Causality can also work in different directions, but theory suggests that such 
direction could be viewed as additions to the above graph.  
The North East has been subject to a long term neglect which translates into 
low level of or declining development. This coincides with identity lines, which 
results in a volatile situation. The same goes for the Niger Delta if perceiving 
identity as a common political and economic situation vis-a-vis the corrupt 
politicians together with the oil companies. The destruction of the Niger Delta 
environment is a considerable intervening variable and a main reason to retaliate 
against the security forces of the state. The level of oil theft suggests that it cannot 
be done without considerable involvement of authorities. The amnesty deal has 
reduced the violence, but only with mixed results. The level of radicalization 
should partake in the explanation of the violence in the North East since it leads to 
increased and graver violence.   
The reason behind the fact the South West is largely peaceful seems to be that 
it performs better on several development indicators such as low poverty, high 
education, and low unemployment. The region is also composed of a mixture of 
identities, which lessens the likelihood for an insurgency to take root, as a 
possible member base is not cohesive. Lagos seems to absorb youth restiveness 
since it offers the possibility to make a living. This region is still characterized 
with a high crime rate and the occurrence of political protests and riots. However, 
bad performing independent variables would need to be in place for an insurgency 
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to emerge – in accordance with how to understand reasons behind peace in 
Nigeria. 
6.1 Future Research 
Future research on peace and conflict within Nigeria could focus on the following:  
 
North West 
North West is worse off in terms of poverty than the North East, but has little or 
no insurgent activity. Investigating why could be fruitful. It could be that Boko 
Haram does not view this region as strategically important to target. Why Boko 
Haram emerged from an area slightly better off than the North West could 
possibly be explained by the need for capacities stressed by Gurr, which could be 
investigated further. 
 
South East 
The state of Cross Rivers in the South East could be used to control for variables. 
This state is considered as peaceful and one explanation could be that it is free 
from environmental pollution, only bordering the oil field to its west. An 
informant point out that Cross Rivers harvests money from off-shore oil rigs. 
Such rigs do not have the same impact on the environment on the lands and fresh 
waters which is the case in the Niger Delta area. (Interview 5) The lack of 
environmental degradation could explain why Cross Rivers is peaceful; something 
a comparative study between the Delta and Cross Rivers could investigate. 
 
South West: OPC 
Understanding peace in the South West could be done by a more thorough 
investigation of the OPC and why it went form a militant to a more politically 
influential group. This has not been the exact intention of this investigation which 
applies Gurr‘s theory which is focused on why insurgencies emerge, and not why 
they decline. Gurr‘s theory is still useful to gain an understanding of the 
peacefulness in the South West. The urban factor could also be of interest to 
investigate further. 
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6.2 Executive Summary 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how the reasons behind peace and 
conflict within Nigeria can be understood. It deals with two cases of conflict, 
namely the North East and the Niger Delta and one case of peace, namely the 
South West. The main contributions this study makes is that it, first, integrates a 
peaceful case within a country marred with internal strife, why both peace and 
conflict can be understood and, second, it also integrates the role of the Nigerian 
state in order to understand the outcomes more comprehensively.   
Boko Haram is an Islamic militant sect primarily active in the North East of 
the country with the aim to establish a pure Islamic state in the primarily Muslim 
North. It translates into ―Western education is forbidden‖ and it attacks those who 
they perceive represent the West or the secular state of Nigeria. Targets are 
corrupt politicians or religious leaders, state security forces, churches, bars and 
public schools. Bank robberies and kidnappings of Nigerians finance their 
insurgency. 
MEND (the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) is an 
umbrella organization of armed gangs that is active in the Niger Delta region. It is 
a reaction of the impoverishment caused by international oil companies that 
operate in the oil rich region on contracts signed by the corrupt political elite of 
Nigeria. The industries have polluted and destroyed vast areas that before were 
farmlands and fishing waters and the contaminated areas remain uncleaned today. 
MEND targets oil fields and pipelines in order to steal crude oil and the theft 
accounts for at least 7 percent of the daily oil production in Nigeria. It kidnaps 
expatriate oil workers that are being held for ransom and attacks also state security 
forces.  
The South West had a militant organization, the OPC (O‘odua People‘s 
Congress) that rioted and attacked police forces in Lagos after the 1999 elections. 
It changed into a politically active and peaceful group. The South West has no 
organized insurgency today, which is why I treat this region as the peaceful case 
in my study. 
The theoretical field on causes of internal peace and conflict deals with a 
range of independent variables, why I initially did not limit my theoretical scope. 
Theories on the transitional phase of democratization, on governance and political 
instability, and on heterogeneous identities are drawn upon. Ted Robert Gurr‘s 
theory on how to analyze why insurgency emerge from communal groups is 
although used the most. The theoretical chapter summarizes as the following. 
First, transitions to democracy in premature political environments are often a 
potent setting for manipulation of state institutions. Contestation for political 
power plays out violently. Second, the institutions are used to favor certain 
segments of the population disproportionately, at the expense of politically and 
economically marginalized groups. Third, governance can further cement the 
inequality gap if for example corruption, lack of accountability and impunity is 
present at high levels. Fourth, discrimination and repressive policies that goes 
along with identity lines create inequalities that form incentives for communal 
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groups to rebel against. Gurr‘s theory deals with four main factors that are used to 
analyze why such communal groups rebel. These are 1) saliency of ethnocultural 
identity, 2) incentives, 3) capacities and 4) opportunities to take action. Theory is 
applied on the empirical findings in order to see what it has to say about peace and 
conflict in Nigeria. 
With regards to theory of science, I place my study within a reflexivist 
approach. This sees the world as inseparable from the subjective researcher, why 
intersubjectivity is used to show what aspects my study is contingent on. It also 
put emphasis on transfactualism, that is, the possibility to link variables or 
phenomena with each other without observing the casual path directly. Since these 
links are unobservable, it is crucial to apply theoretical claims on how 
relationships between phenomena can be understood.  
The used method is a within-case comparison which lays out the general 
Nigerian context and compares the three cases that are found within the country. I 
selected cases on the dependent variable and those who are extremes – the two 
cases of conflict are the two most violent regions in recent years and the peaceful 
case is a large region freed from organized insurgency. The reason for this 
selection of cases is that I get a great variation on the dependent variable in order 
to understand the causal relationship correctly. A within-case comparison enables 
one to reach secure conclusions since several variables can be held constant. 
Those independent variables that differ are thought to contain explanatory power. 
The empirical material for this thesis is mainly qualitative interview material 
that was collected on an eight week field trip to Abuja, capital of Nigeria. 
Disaggregated statistics on the state or regional level was also used to get case 
specific values on certain developmental variables. I interviewed a range of 
people from both the international community and local Nigerians that had 
knowledge on aspects relevant for my investigation. The semi-structured 
informant interview method was used, something that enables the interview 
objects to talk freely and express their views in their own way. All interviews 
were recorded, something which enabled an analytical coding procedure of the 
material. Since I searched for explanatory factors, I identified those that were 
most salient and notable. The material was broken down into text segments that 
were labeled with a summarizing variable name and I also analyzed how the 
relationship between the variables best could be understood. This procedure 
helped me to reduce my list of independent variables.  
A procedure of coding the variables had its purpose to bracket their values into 
―low‖, ―medium‖ and ―high‖. This enables me to describe the variance among the 
different variables, a crucial step in a method of comparison. The main analytical 
apparatus, the variable scheme, is the following:  
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Variables CV 1 CV 2 CV 3  CV 4  CV 5 IV 1 IV 2 IV 3 IV 4 IV 5 IV 6 DV (conflict) 
Cases 
            
North East 
           
Yes, High 
Niger Delta 
           
Yes, Medium 
South West 
           
No, Low 
 
 
Constant variables: 
CV 1 – Bad governance 
CV 2 – Weak accountability 
CV 3 – Impunity 
CV 4 – Corruption 
CV 5 – Economic inequality 
 
Independent variables: 
IV 1 – Poverty 
IV 2 – Non-education 
IV 3 – Unemployment 
IV 4 – Salience of youth unemployment 
 
Intervening variables: 
IV 5 – Salience of religious identity 
IV 6 – Salience of environmental degradation 
 
Dependent variable 
DV – Conflict  
 
The aim of the empirical chapter is to show the material needed in order to 
input values into the cells in the above variable scheme. The material is 
reproduced under theoretical subsections and is disposed in the following order: 1) 
country level (if relevant), 2) North East: Boko Haram, 3) Niger Delta: MEND, 
and 4) South West: OPC. The reason for this is to give the reader the most 
comparable structure possible. How all the variables performed between my cases 
is shown. Governance, accountability, impunity, corruption and economic 
inequality performed all badly throughout Nigeria why these were held constant. 
The independent variables poverty, education, unemployment and the saliency of 
youth unemployment show variance between my cases, which is why these should 
contain important explanatory power to the different outcomes. The two 
intervening variables are specific to the two cases of conflict and are hence crucial 
to take into account to understand the reasons for those conflicts and, equally 
important, the two intervening variables also show low scores in the peaceful 
case.  
A revisit to theory concludes that past findings are to a great extent applicable 
on Nigeria and the three within-cases. The violent transitional phase indicates a 
premature political landscape. Lack of accountability and corruption show the 
manipulation which results in a gap between the political elite and the general 
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population. Long-term neglect towards the North East and the Niger Delta in 
terms of underdevelopment can be seen. The neglect also went along identity lines 
which created a discriminatory setting and a durable opportunity and an incentive 
for the emergence of insurgency. Capacities are helped by a preexisting 
organization or identity base in the two cases of conflict and the lack of such 
preexisting organization in the South West should account for some explanation 
behind the peaceful outcome. 
Lastly, the values on my variables are the following: 
 
Variables CV 1 CV 2 CV 3  CV 4  CV 5 IV 1 IV 2 IV 3 IV 4 IV 5 IV 6 DV (conflict) 
Cases 
            
North East High High High High High High High High High High Medium Yes, High 
Niger Delta High High High High High Medium Medium Medium High Low High Yes, Medium 
South West High High High High High Medium Low Low Low Low Low No, Low 
 
Political manipulation creates high levels of bad governance, lack of 
accountability, impunity, corruption and economic inequality (constant variables, 
CV, 1-5) – throughout Nigeria. However, these are not sufficient to explain 
conflict since these features are present even in the South West. Explanation 
should therefore be found in the independent (IV 1-4) and intervening (IV 5-6) 
variables. Levels of education and unemployment correlate strongly with the 
different outcomes, whilst also other variables (poverty, salience of youth 
unemployment, salience of religious identity and salience of environmental 
degradation) correlate fairly strong, or, the values are almost always in accordance 
with the outcome value. A range of variables could hence contain explanatory 
power. Bad performing variables coincide with identity lines in the two cases of 
conflict, something that is not present in the South West which consists of a 
mixture of people and a split in religiosity. This region performs better overall on 
the independent and intervening variables.  
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8 Appendix A 
8.1 The Informants 
Out of the 20 interviews, only 4 felt that they could be open with their identity and 
16 wanted to be anonymous. This could be an indicator of the bad security 
situation in the country. I did not ask why they wanted to be anonymous, but some 
stated the worsened security situation as a reason. The titles of some informants 
are written deliberately unspecific due to anonymity.  
 
Interview 1 – Anonymous, Ph.D. working in an international organization, 
Nigerian 
Interview 2 – Anonymous, Western diplomat 1 
Interview 3 – Anonymous, Western journalist 
Interview 4 – Anonymous, Western diplomat 2 
Interview 5 – Anonymous, Nigerian Igbo, lawyer 
Interview 6 – Mr. Thomas Mättig, Head of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Abuja 
Interview 7 – Anonymous, Nigerian working in the civil society 
Interview 8 – Anonymous, Western diplomat 3 
Interview 9 – Anonymous, Working in an international organization 
Interview 10 – Anonymous, Working in an international organization 
Interview 11 – Anonymous, Nigerian Yorubaman working in the service sector 
Interview 12 – Anonymous, Western diplomat 4 
Interview 13 – Anonymous, Analyst in a western aid agency 
Interview 14 – Anonymous, Professor within the field of Peace and Conflict 
studies, Nigerian 
Interview 15 – Anonymous, High-level ministry worker, Nigerian 
Interview 16 – Anonymous, Nigerian northerner working in the service sector 
Interview 17 – Mr. Udenta O. Udenta, Director at Centre for Alternative Policy 
Perspective and Strategy, Nigerian 
Interview 18 – Ms. Esther Uzoma, Nigerian lawyer 
Interview 19 – Ms. Abiodun Baiyewu, Country Director at Global Rights, 
Nigerian 
Interview 20 – Anonymous, Analyst in a Niger Delta NGO, Nigerian 
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9 Appendix B 
9.1 The Interview Structure 
Warm up 
 
 Thanking for letting me interview the person. 
 ―I am in Abuja on a scholarship to collect interview material for my 
Master‘s thesis I write in political science at Lund University, 
Sweden. I want to explain the difference of peace and conflict within 
Nigeria by looking at three cases, namely the (1) Boko Haram in the 
North East, (2) MEND in the Niger Delta and (3) the peaceful region 
in the South West. I want to explain the underlying causes and 
dynamics behind the different situations.‖ 
 ―I cannot use a standardized questionnaire due to the problem of 
representativeness since I cannot travel to the conflict zones. The 
interview is instead more of a talk or a discussion and every interview 
is one piece of the puzzle.‖ 
 Asking about the work the person is doing, and if he or she was from 
the international community, how long he or she has been in Nigeria. 
 Stating that the interview would last for approximately an hour and 
asking for permission to record the interview. Consent to record was 
always given. 
 Stating that it is completely fine if informant wants to be anonymous. 
Anonymity was recommended if this enabled them to speak more 
freely. 
 
The variables 
 
 The interview varied in time and relative who I was talking to, but the 
data I wanted to extract revolved around the below checklist of 
independent variables: 
 
 State militarization 
 Hatred due to history of armed conflict 
 Economic marginalization/asymmetry  
 Political marginalization/asymmetry 
 Demographic stress   
 Environmental stress    
 International rebel assistance    
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 Un-responsiveness of the central power  
 Weakness of political institutions  
 Corruption    
 Religious difference (within the region)  
 Religious difference (towards other regions)  
 Ethnic difference 
 Unemployment 
 Youth unemployment 
 Accessibility of SALW (Small Arms and Light Weapons) 
 Collective incentives for political action    
 Salience of ethnocultural identity   
 Capacities for political action    
 Availability of opportunities for political action    
 Rebel mobilization   
 
The questions 
 
 Below are examples of the specific questions I asked. My aim was to 
pose the same questions towards every case. Follow-up questions were 
asked when it would give me a more comprehensive understanding or 
clarifications.  
 
 How would you describe the [North East / Delta region / South West] in terms 
of the [lack of development / security situation / etc]?  
 How would you describe the [Independent variable expressed more 
comprehensible, for example: security situation / culture / ethnicity / religion / 
economic situation / environment degradation / corruption / level of 
unemployment] in the [case / region]? 
 How does the aspect of [level of militarization / political marginalization / 
economic marginalization / corruption / youth unemployment / criminal 
activity] relate to the abovementioned issue in the [case/region]? 
 How would you assess the amnesty program towards the MEND? 
 What is your opinion on the possibility of an amnesty program to Boko 
Haram? 
 How would you describe the state response against the Boko Haram? 
 Etc. 
 
Outro 
 
 ―I am basically done with my questions, but I still want to ask if there 
is anything that you want to add, anything that you feel should be 
mentioned relating to peace and conflict in Nigeria?‖ 
 ―Could you recommend someone that I should interview?‖ 
 ―Thank you for your participation!‖ 
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10 Appendix C 
10.1 Coding the Variables 
Constant variables: 
CV 1 – Bad governance 
CV 2 – Weak accountability 
CV 3 – Impunity 
CV 4 – Corruption 
CV 5 – Economic inequality 
 
The constant variables are not varying within Nigeria, which is why they are held 
constant. Since the empirical sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1 show that constant variables 
are at high levels throughout the country, I will not code the values ―medium‖ or 
―low‖.  
 
Independent variables: 
IV 1 – Poverty 
IV 2 – Non-education 
IV 3 – Unemployment 
IV 4 – Salience of youth unemployment 
 
It is a somewhat delicate task to code poverty, education and unemployment in 
cases within a developing country. It would be unfair to compare such countries 
with highly developed ones. Since the scores on these variables are poor between 
all cases, I have deliberately chosen to adjust the coding of these values so that 
they become more in tune with the case of Nigeria. For example, I code poverty as 
―low‖ if it is below 20 percent. The reason behind this adjustment is 1) due to the 
fact that Nigeria is a developing country and 2) that it otherwise would be hard to 
draw any meaningful conclusions, for example if all cases were to be labeled with 
a high poverty rate.  
 
Poverty:   0 – 25 percent = Low 
26 – 50 percent = Medium 
51 – 100 percent = High 
  
Non-education (illiteracy): The share of illiterate children aged 5-16. 
 
0 – 25 percent = Low 
   26 – 50 percent = Medium 
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   51 – 100 percent = High 
 
Unemployment:  0 – 15 percent = Low 
16 – 25 percent = Medium 
26 – 100 percent = High 
 
Salience of youth unemployment:  There are no published statistics on youth 
unemployment on state level in Nigeria. The 
youth unemployment is although thought to 
follow the same pattern between the cases as 
the overall unemployment. This is based on 
two premises. First, the overall unemployment 
has risen from 13,1 percent in 2000 to 21,1 
percent in 2010 and second, that the youth 
segment (aged 15 – 24) makes up 35 percent of 
the total unemployed population. But since I 
cannot find the exact statistics, I do not name 
the variable ―Youth unemployment‖ but 
instead ―Salience of youth unemployment‖. 
Youths makes up a crucial base of the 
insurgent members and, on the contrary, Lagos 
absorbs many of the poor youths in the 
southwestern states who seeks to make a living 
(Interview 19). 
 
Intervening variables 
IV 6 – Salience of religious identity 
IV 7 – Salience of environmental degradation 
 
Salience of religious identity: The value given to the North East is ―high‖ 
since religious identity is one of the central 
components of Boko Haram (Interview 
1,2,12,13,19). Since I have not found that 
religion play any significant effect with regards 
to identity in the other regions, I find it fair to 
label them as ―low‖. 
 
Salience of environmental  
degradation:  Niger Delta gets the value ―high‖ since vast 
areas are destroyed because of oil spills and gas 
flaring (Interview 4,20). I gave the North East 
the value ―medium‖ since this region is to a 
large extent a desert area. (Interview 12). I 
gave the South West the value ―low‖ because 
the larger southern region is a lush tropical area 
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and that the South West is freed from the 
environmental degradation of the Niger Delta. 
 
Dependent variable 
DV Conflict 
 
Conflict  Drawn on the size of the violence (ACLED 
2013) in the three cases, they are labeled as 
follows: North East: conflict (high), Niger 
Delta: conflict (medium) and South West: no 
conflict (low). 
10.2 Coding the Interview Material 
The below table exemplifies the logic of how quotes are coded as (1) variables 
and (2) a causal chain, two of the most crucial units of achieving analytical 
comprehension of vast amounts of interview material (Kvale and Brinkmann 
2009:218; Strauss and Corbin 1998:57,66; Lantz 2007:110). This enables 
comparability and understanding of how variables interact. 
 
Quotation (text segment) Variable(s) Causal chain 
 
―You can see a sharp divide between the haves and the 
have nots and it speaks to even the proportion of people 
that are literate or educated vis-à-vis those that are not 
literate and not educated, you see a lot of people that are 
out of school in much of the north and this has been like 
that for many years so the situation in the north right now, 
with the insecurity and radicalism is just like playing out 
what would have been predicted many years ago and it is 
something that also speaks to what is happening in other 
part of this country.‖ (Interview 14) 
 
 
Education 
 
Radicalism 
 
Low level of education  
proneness to 
radicalization. 
 
High level of education  
low proneness to 
radicalization. 
 
 
 
―Everyone has first of all to rely on himself or herself for 
basic needs; access to water access to electricity, access to 
education. Public education is a disaster. Many Nigerians 
use to say each Nigerian is a head of government in his 
own capacity because they have to manage the mini-state 
which is the house and provide all the basic services for the 
household, water, electricity, employment, healthcare, all 
these things you would expect the state to have some 
degree of intervention or interference, especially in a poor 
country like this one.‖ (Interview 4) 
 
 
Lack of welfare system. 
 
System of self-reliance 
 
Lack of welfare system  
system of self-reliance 
 
―The issue behind terrorism a lot of time is a quest to 
protect identity. It is a strange symmetry of two fearful 
groups, a group that often feels that identity is being 
trampled on or overlooked by another group and in 
 
Independent variable: 
Threat towards identity 
preservation. 
 
 
Threat towards identity 
preservation  resort to 
violence. 
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wanting to preserve culture and identity, identity in this 
instance being Islam, will then fight back and people don‘t 
often understand that the fight back a lot of time is from the 
fear of losing their identity so they try to create fear in the 
other group‖ (Interview 19) 
 
Dependent variable: resort 
to violence in disputes. 
 
 
 
―There doesn‘t seem to be a media strategy or a campaign 
to get the message to the people and when you don‘t get a 
positive message to the people, all they can see is actions 
and they have seen cases, Baga being the most recent, 
where security forces have entered into a strategy that has 
resulted in, unconfirmed numbers, but 180 people being 
killed. I think they forget that people then can‘t support the 
government either, if innocent people are being killed. I 
don‘t think they have understood that you can get the 
peoples‘ support and you can do it at a lower level.‖ 
(Interview 9) 
 
 
Independent variable: 
Militaristic response of the 
state. 
 
Dependent variable: 
Mistrust towards the 
government. 
 
Militaristic response of the 
state  Mistrust towards 
the government. 
 
―Politics is a bit of a closed system. When you are in, you 
are not going to be loyal to the people because they cannot 
punish you and they cannot reward you. You cannot base 
your mandate on the people. You have to satisfy those who 
got you in that position and those are not the people 
because the election has been rigged. So it‘s the people 
who gave you the candidacy in the party, who rigged for 
you, who supported you with money in your candidacy. 
Those are the people you have to serve first.‖ (Interview 6) 
 
 
Accountability 
 
Low level of 
accountability  
politicians independent of 
their population. 
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11 Appendix D 
11.1 Maps of Nigeria 
The below maps show that Nigeria is a highly divided nation politically, 
ethnically, and in terms of wealth, health, literacy and oil production. All maps are 
collected from BBC (2011-04-04). 
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11.1.1  Result of Presidential Election in 2011 
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11.1.2  Nigeria‘s Ethnic Composition  
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11.1.3  Wealth Distribution in Nigeria 
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11.1.4 Health Distribution in Nigeria 
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11.1.5  Female Literacy in Nigeria 
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11.1.6  Oil in Nigeria 
 
 
 
 
 
  
